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Courts have become increasingly likely in recent years to find class
arbitration waivers in consumer product sales unenforceable due to the
lack of incentives for consumers and their attorneys to recover for “low-
value” claims.  This Article explores the history of the unconscionability
and vindication-of-statutory rights doctrines invoked by those courts.  It
then analyzes the progression of the class arbitration waiver in the con-
sumer products industry, with emphasis on the third-generation “incen-
tivizing” agreement.  This “incentivizing” agreement, if viewed at the
time of the purchase agreement, can be mutually beneficial to seller and
consumer.  Some consumers may wish to forego the option for class rep-
resentation of classic “low-value” claims in turn for inexpensive and
swift arbitration of more substantial claims.  Further, the “third genera-
tion” class arbitration waiver cures the concerns traditionally identified
by courts by providing  incentives to the consumer for pursuing low-
value claims, in that the consumer is afforded a windfall premium if the
seller/manufacture does not “pay up” on valid claims prior to
arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
Is arbitration under attack?  Since the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) created a body of federal substantive law
placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts,1 it
has become fashionable in the consumer products industry to include in a
services or sales contract a provision requiring the purchaser and pro-
vider to submit all claims to binding arbitration.2  In order to streamline
1 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration.”).
2 For a history of the adoption of the consumer-product arbitration agreement, see
Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 394–98 (2005); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Mini-
mum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 398 (2008) (“The practical conse-
quences of the new legal era were significant.  Arbitration left the province of particular
business guilds or commercial environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the adju-
dicatory function. . . .  [A] genre of new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements
were essentially imposed upon a large, general class of consumers and workers.”).
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the arbitration process and alleviate the burden of costly consumer class
action suits, manufacturers and service providers have started to require
that consumers waive the right to proceed in court or in arbitration on a
class-wide basis.  These agreements to binding individual arbitration are
present in consumer credit agreements, wireless or cable service agree-
ments, and a burgeoning array of consumer products sales agreements.3
Almost any cell-phone wielding, credit-card bearing, cable-network con-
sumer has, knowingly or not, agreed to a form of binding individual
arbitration.
At the outset, courts embraced arbitration-with-class-waiver provi-
sions in light of the general policy favoring arbitration agreements.4  In
recent years, however, courts have examined the class-waiver arbitration
agreement with increased paternalism on behalf of the consumer.  Under
the FAA, an arbitration clause may be invalidated solely on general con-
tract defenses grounded in state law; states and courts may not adopt
3 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (setting
forth Discover Bank’s arbitration policy); AT&T Wireless Service Agreement para. 6, http://
www.wireless.att.com/learn/articles-resources/wireless-terms.jsp (follow “Terms of Service”
hyperlink) (last visited April 8, 2009); Comcast Agreement for Residential Services § 13(c),
http://www.comcast.com (follow “Customers”; then follow “Customer Agreements/Policies”;
then follow “Customer Agreement for Residential Services” hyperlink) (last visited April 8,
2009); Time Warner Cable Residential Subscriber Agreement § 14, http://help.twcable.com/
html/twc_sub_agreement.html (last visited April 8, 2009); Dell’s Online Policies: Terms and
Conditions of Sale § 12, http:///www.dell.com (follow “Terms of Sale” hyperlink at bottom of
page) (last visited April 8, 2009); T-Mobile Terms & Conditions § 2, http://www.t-mobile.com
(follow “Terms & Conditions” hyperlink at bottom of page) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
4 See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (“Con-
gress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy
favoring [it] and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.’”
(quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006))); see also
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 n.4 (1974) (explaining that American courts
adopted the English view that arbitration agreements ousted the courts of jurisdiction, and
refused to enforce such agreements).  To that end, the FAA provides that arbitration agree-
ments “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  Additionally, a court must
stay its proceedings if the issue before it is arbitrable under the agreement. Id. § 3.  The court
must issue an order compelling arbitration if there has been a “failure, neglect, or refusal” to
comply with the arbitration agreement. Id. § 4.  Furthermore, a court may vacate an arbitration
award only if (1) “procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;” (2) “evident partiality” is
present in one or more of the arbitrators; (3) “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct”
whereby the rights of the party have been prejudiced (such as refusing to postpone a hearing);
or (4) “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” Id. § 10.  Simi-
larly, an arbitration award may be modified only (1) where there is an “evident material mis-
calculation” or mistake referred to in the award; (2) “[w]here the arbitrators have awarded
upon a matter not submitted to them”; or (3) “the award is imperfect in [a] . . . form not
affecting the merits.” Id. § 11.  And then, the court may only modify or correct the award “so
as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.” Id.  This limited scope
of judicial review for extreme arbitral conduct may not be contractually modified by the par-
ties. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1403–04.
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contract rules or defenses that operate to discriminate against arbitration
provisions.5  Thus, most courts faced with an issue of enforceability ini-
tially focused on whether an arbitration agreement with a class arbitra-
tion waiver clause was unconscionable.  Some courts, most notably the
federal courts in the Ninth Circuit and state courts in California, have
found that a class arbitration waiver is almost always unconscionable
because the costs of pursuing arbitration individually would discourage
the individual consumer from filing the arbitration claim.6  But most
courts have not held an arbitration agreement to be unconscionable at the
time it was formed, even if it included a class-action waiver.7
However, the judicial support for arbitration in some contexts is
waning, perhaps unnecessarily so.  In the wake of literature predicting
“The Forth-Coming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action,”8
courts are now looking to whether the class arbitration waiver deprives a
plaintiff of his opportunity to vindicate a statutory right.  And some
courts are invalidating the arbitration agreement, class arbitration waiver,
or both, in the name of preserving the class action.9  Scholars are now
5 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989) (quoting § 2 of the FAA); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987) (quoting § 2 of the FAA).
6 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding class action waiver in cell phone agreement unconscionable pursuant to Cali-
fornia law); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
class arbitration waiver in employment contract unconscionable); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d
1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding class arbitration waiver in contract for telephone services
unconscionable); Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108 (holding that “class action waivers found in
[adhesion] contracts may also be substantively unconscionable inasmuch as they may operate
effectively as exculpatory contract clauses that are contrary to public policy”); Szetela v. Dis-
cover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding class action waiver
in credit card agreement unconscionable for lacking mutuality in agreement).
7 See, e.g., Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus. Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that prohibition of collective action in arbitration agreement not unconscionable);
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) (enforcing class arbitration
waiver in a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290
F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 818–19 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding that right to class action under TILA is not non-waivable).
8 Gilles, supra note 2, at 375 (predicting that corporate America will increasingly adopt
the class action waiver and “class actions will soon be virtually extinct”).
9 See id. at 430 (predicting that the class arbitration waiver will find success in the
courts, but advocating legislation to preserve the class action); see also In re Am. Express
Litig., 554 F. 3d 300, 311–12 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he wisdom and utility of these [class waiver]
provisions has become the subject of intense debate.”).  Professor Gilles’s article has been
cited by at least four courts in striking a class action waiver as unconscionable. See Skirchak
v. Dynamics Research Corp. 508 F.3d 49, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding class action waiver
unconscionable); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (invalidating
class arbitration waiver under vindication-of-statutory-rights analysis); Cooper v. QC Fin.
Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1288 (D. Ariz. 2007) (finding class arbitration waiver
unconscionable); Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 102 n.6 (N.J.
2006) (finding class action waiver unconscionable).
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calling for action by the Supreme Court on this issue,10 and others are
calling for Congressional legislation prohibiting all predispute collective
action waivers.11  Already we have seen the proposal of wide-sweeping
legislation to amend the FAA (introduced by the plaintiff’s advocacy
group Public Citizen),12 through the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act
(AFA), which would render unenforceable any pre-dispute arbitration
agreement of (1) “an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute” or (2)
“a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights or to
regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining
power.”13  Not only would the AFA cover almost any contractual rela-
tionship, but it would also apply to contracts entered into prior to the
passage of the legislation.14  And some states have passed legislation—
no doubt preempted by the FAA15—directing courts to find class action
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements unenforceable, or to apply
heightened scrutiny to such contracts.16
10 See, e.g., Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215,
219 (2008) (urging that “[t]he time has come for the Supreme Court to settle the question once
and for all”).
11 Meredith R. Miller, Contracting out of Process, Contracting out of Corporate Ac-
countability: An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN.
L. REV. 365, 404 (2008). Miller proposes that Congress amend the FAA to state “that pre-
dispute arbitration terms that ban collective action, limit discovery or shorten the statute of
limitations in standardized form agreements . . . are per se unenforceable.” Id. at 404–05.
This per se ban on pre-dispute limitations is not limited to solely consumer, or even employ-
ment, arbitration agreements; it ostensibly extends even to arbitration agreements between
businesses. Id. at 405.
12 See Miller, supra note 11, at 370 (referring to the Arbitration Fairness Act as
“[m]aligned as the plaintiff bar’s ‘pro-lawsuit legislation’”); see also Joan Claybrook, Letter to
the Editor, Party at Joan’s, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2007, at A9 (Response letter by Public
Citizen stating, “We oppose mandatory not voluntary arbitration requirements . . . .”).  The
legislation backed by Public Citizen would do more than invalidate non-voluntary arbitration
agreements—it would render unenforceable per se any pre-dispute agreement to waive class
claims in the consumer, employment, or franchise context regardless of whether the waiver is
voluntary or not.
13 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. §3 (2007) (intro-
duced July 12, 2007).  The Arbitration Fairness Act was reintroduced on February 12, 2009, as
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009), and has been referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary. See H.R. 1020 Bill Status and Summary, www.
thomas.gov (search “Search Bill Summary & Status” for “Arbitration Fairness Act”; then fol-
low “H.R.1020” hyperlink; then follow “All Information” hyperlink”) (last visited Apr. 8,
2009).
14 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, § 5 (requiring that the proposed amendments “apply
with respect to any dispute or claim that arises on or after [enactment of this Act]”).  Perhaps
due to its almost limitless scope, the AFA is not likely to be enacted. See Miller, supra note
11, at 370.
15 See infra Part I.A; see also Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.2d 1215, 1219 (N.M.
2008) (recognizing that New Mexico statute declaring arbitration with class waiver clauses
unenforceable “may be preempted by the FAA”).
16 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746c(7) (2004) (“A high cost home loan shall not
provide for or include . . . [a] mandatory arbitration clause or a waiver of participation in a
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But is this broad legislation, or even a bright-line Supreme Court
prohibition of the class arbitration waiver, prudent?17  Assuming that a
party can always pursue arbitration for his claim, no matter how little the
value is, does the waiver of the opportunity to bring a collective action
really deprive that consumer of his opportunity to vindicate a statutory
right?18  And can agreements that provide cost-effective measures for
pursuing individual claims really be unconscionable—if the parties’ po-
sitions are assessed as they existed at the time the agreement was formed,
instead of after a cause of action has potentially arisen? Would the con-
sideration be different if the agreement provided opt-out opportunities
and cost-savings provisions for potential parties?
class action.”) (effective April 22, 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(c)(2) (2007) (requiring
courts to consider “[w]hether the contract restricts or excludes damages or remedies that would
be available to the borrower in court, including the right to participate in a class action” in
determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, and hence, unenforceable
(emphasis added)) (effective May 1, 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7A-1(b)(4), 44-7A-5
(2004) (declaring a “disabling civil dispute clause” in an arbitration agreement is unenforce-
able and voidable by the consumer, borrower, tenant, or employee; a “disabling civil dispute
clause” is defined, in part, as a clause which requires the consumer, tenant or employee to
“decline to participate in a class action”) (effective July 1, 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1880 (Supp. 2008) (requiring that courts “closely review[ ]” arbitration agreements that
“deny[ ] the ability to consolidate arbitrations or to have arbitration for a class of persons
involving substantially similar issues” for unconscionability) (effective Jan. 1, 2006).  To the
extent any of these laws purport to treat arbitration agreements, and class action waivers within
arbitration agreements, differently from other general contracts, they are preempted by the
FAA. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“Courts may not,
however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration pro-
visions.”).  Utah, however, has enacted legislation recognizing that class action waivers
(whether in an arbitration agreement or not) are enforceable so long as the waiver is conspicu-
ously drafted. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70C-3-104, 70C-4-105 (Supp. 2008) (allowing creditor to
contract with debtor for waiver of class action if the provision is in bold and all caps) (effec-
tive Mar. 15, 2006).
17 There are numerous reasons that the Supreme Court would reject a bright-line ruling
that class arbitration waivers are unenforceable, and equivalent reasons that a per se approval
of all class arbitration waivers is equally unlikely. See infra Part II.B.1.c (discussing Green
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), and the burden of proof placed on the
party resisting arbitration).  The question of who decides whether the class action waiver is
enforceable at all is an issue much more likely to be resolved by the Court in light of Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (“[U]nless the challenge is to
the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in
the first instance.”).  The resolution of this question, however, is far from clear. See infra Part
I.B (discussing the problems with determining whether a class arbitration waiver is a gateway
issue of arbitrability).
18 Although opponents of the class arbitration waiver often refer to the “right” to a class
action, it is clear that “there is no substantive right to a class remedy; a class action is a
procedural device.”  Blaz v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979) (referring to class action as “an exception to the usual
rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only”); Cau-
dle v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 230 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring to a certified class
action as merely a “procedural device aggregating multiple persons’ claims” that “does not
entitle anyone to be in litigation”).
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This Article examines the evolution of the class-waiver arbitration
agreement, and concludes that there is no need for broad legislation re-
stricting freedom of contract.  Nor is there a need for judicial paternalism
in holding that all class arbitration waiver procedures are per se unen-
forceable (whether through the unconscionability rubric or vindication-
of-statutory-rights defense).  Neither remedy is necessary because the
businesses which desire the enforcement of these particular forms of ar-
bitration agreements are proactively curing the issue.19  The American
public is engaging in a dialogue with corporate America, using the court
system as their mouthpiece to demand what is reasonable and important
in binding arbitration, and corporate America is listening.  The result is
an evolution of new “consumer-friendly” arbitration contracts—contracts
designed by corporations to remedy defects found by courts voiding the
clauses on the basis of unconscionability—whereby traditional concerns
are alleviated.20
Part I of this Article will outline the landscape of attacks on the
enforcement of individual arbitration of consumer claims, and describe
the three areas in which issues regarding arbitrability arise.  Part II will
then turn to the question of enforceability, by describing the defense of
unconscionability, exploring the origins of the vindication-of-statutory-
rights doctrine, and analyzing their recent use in voiding class arbitration
waivers.  Part III will then examine how the market has responded to
cases invalidating the class action waiver in the past, and propose that the
solution is forthcoming: an arbitration agreement that provides an oppor-
tunity to opt out of binding arbitration and provides incentives for arbi-
trating even low-dollar individual claims.  Finally, Part IV will explore
the benefits of optional “incentivizing” arbitration agreements for both
consumers and corporate providers in entering into the new phase of con-
sumer arbitration agreements.  These incentivizing arbitration agree-
ments provide a tailored, inexpensive method of preserving the contract
for binding, individual arbitration while ensuring that valid, albeit low-
recovery claims, are capable of being pursued.
I. LEVELING THE ARBITRATION PLAYING FIELD
Under the FAA, all “contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
19 The latest iteration of arbitration agreements that are “consumer-friendly” are un-
doubtedly reactions to cases in jurisdictions that were universally hostile to class-waiver arbi-
tration provisions.  That these progressions are reactionary, however, does not take away from
their evolution towards a class-waiver provision that should be enforceable under the tradi-
tional unconscionability or vindication-of-statutory-rights defenses.
20 See infra Part IV.
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for the revocation of any contract.”21  In a series of cases, the Supreme
Court interpreted this statutory provision as creating a substantive body
of federal law, applicable in state courts, that places arbitration agree-
ments on equal footing with other contracts.22  Arbitration agreements
may only be invalidated on state law grounds if the defense arose to
govern the validity of general contracts.23  In other words, state laws
which operate solely to invalidate or discriminate against arbitration
agreements are preempted by the FAA.24  Not only did the Supreme
Court advance the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments”25 through these decisions, it has also held that in cases contesting
the validity of the contract, as opposed to the arbitration clause alone, the
decision of validity or enforcement is for the arbitrator—not the court.26
Thus, in the vast landscape of arbitration-land, there are generally
three main vehicles to bring a party back to the familiar territory of the
court: (1) Questions of Preemption; (2) Questions of Arbitrability—or
“Who decides?”; and (3) Questions of Enforceability.  Each of these
questions is inter-related, particularly in the context of the class arbitra-
tion waiver.
21 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
22 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281–82 (1995); Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987) (invalidating state law that limited wage-collection ac-
tions to state court, “without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate”
(citing CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 229 (West 1971))); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10
(1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbi-
tration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”); see also, Diane P. Wood,
The Brave New World of Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383 (2003) (“[T]here can be no
denying that . . . the Court has systematically dismantled the remaining legal constraints that
stood in the way of the recognition of agreements to arbitrate, the enforcement of such agree-
ments, and the enforcement of the resulting arbitral awards.”).
23 E.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry, 482 U.S.
at 492; Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
24 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492.
25 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  The
Court has explicitly applied Section 2’s liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements to con-
sumer contracts.  As the Court stated in Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, “We agree that
Congress, when enacting [Section 2], had the needs of consumers, as well as others, in
mind. . . .  Indeed, arbitration’s advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, com-
plaining about a product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation.” 513 U.S. at 280
(emphasis added).
26 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (“[U]nless
the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered
by the arbitrator in the first instance.”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) (“[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself—an issue which goes to the ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court
may proceed to adjudicate it.  But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to
consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.”).
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A. Questions of Preemption
Although the FAA may have originally been intended to apply to
only federal courts,27 since the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in South-
land v. Keating, the FAA’s substantive application in state courts and
preemption of state laws undercutting the enforceability of arbitration
agreements has been accepted.28  Clear cases of preemption by the FAA
arise when state laws, on their face, purport to treat arbitration agree-
ments differently from other contracts.29  Section 2 of the FAA explicitly
forbids this.30  Thus, state laws cannot require arbitration agreements to
be placed in a particular font,31 nor can they foreclose certain classes of
disputes from arbitration.32
A less clear issue is whether a state law defense generally applicable
to all contracts, but developed in a specific way so as to apply only to
arbitration clauses, is also preempted.  This issue has particular signifi-
cance to the class-arbitration-waiver analysis because some states have
declared class arbitration waivers to be universally—or almost univer-
sally—void according to state law principles of unconscionability or
public policy.33  For example, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,34 the
California Supreme Court set forth a standard of unconscionability in
which most class arbitration waivers will be deemed substantively un-
conscionable.35  Thus, in California, state law has potentially developed
27 See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 182–85 (2002) (“[T]he FAA created no new
rights and no independent federal-question jurisdiction.  Rather, cast as a “procedural” statute,
it declared the validity of arbitration agreements and mandated procedures to ensure their en-
forceability in the federal court . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Southland, 465 U.S. at 25
(“[O]ne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s.  That history estab-
lishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable
only in federal courts . . . .”) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Wood, supra note 22, at 383 (“[The
Court] has federalized the law of arbitration to a degree astonishing to those who have thought
of the Rehnquist Court as the new expositor of states’ rights and federalism.”).
28 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
29 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30 Id.
31 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Allied-Bruce
Terminex Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (holding that Section 2 of the FAA
preempts state law making written pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable).
32 This was the issue in Southland.  The Court held that § 31512 of the California
Franchise Investment Law, to the extent the California Supreme Court interpreted it to require
judicial consideration of claims brought under it, was preempted by the FAA. Southland, 465
U.S. at 16.
33 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); Scott v.
Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007) (determining class arbitration waiver to be
void as against public policy and unconscionable).
34 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
35 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.  It should not be surprising that no Califor-
nia or Ninth Circuit court has found any consumer class arbitration waiver satisfactory under
this test.
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to treat arbitration agreements with class arbitration waivers differently
from other contracts.  If it is the case that according to state law, any
arbitration agreement containing a class arbitration waiver is per se unen-
forceable—surely California’s strict treatment of arbitration agreements
with class arbitration waivers would be preempted.36  Although this issue
may present a case for preemption on some occasion, the preemption
issue has not evolved to an appropriate place for Supreme Court review
at this juncture.  Since state courts have carefully crafted language to
indicate that their decisions are applicable only to the case at hand—and
do not operate to invalidate all class arbitration waivers—it is possible,
even probable, that the industry will develop an arbitration clause with a
class waiver that is insusceptible to unconscionability and vindication-of-
statutory-rights defenses.  However, before one arrives at the question of
class-arbitration-waiver enforcement, one must first answer the question
of who decides each of the foregoing issues—judge or arbitrator?
B. Questions of Arbitrability
Certain issues may arise in which it must be determined “who de-
cides” whether the claim proceeds to arbitration—the court or the arbi-
trator?  Questions of arbitrability, which are reserved for the courts to
determine in the first instance, are issues governing the validity of an
arbitration clause or its applicability to the parties.37  These questions of
arbitrability are circumstances in which it is assumed that the parties in-
tended courts, not arbitrators, to determine whether the matter should be
referred to arbitration.38  Other questions of contract interpretation such
36 This is the precise question raised by the petition for certiorari in T-Mobile USA Inc v.
Laster, No. 07-976, 2008 WL  218932, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2500 (2008) (seeking certiorari
on the question presented, “Whether, under the Federal Arbitration Act, a federal court may
refuse to enforce the terms of an agreement to arbitrate based upon a state-law policy that
individual arbitration is unconscionable in cases involving small claims by a consumer?”).
Laster was a petition for certiorari from a Ninth Circuit decision refusing to compel arbitration
under California’s holding in Discover Bank.  See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 252 Fed.
Appx. 777 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Subert v. Wells Fargo Auto Fin., No. 08-3754, 2008 WL
5451021 (D. N.J. Dec. 31, 2008) (holding that to the extent N.J. law renders class arbitration
waivers unconscionable, it is preempted under the FAA).  Whether a state could forbid the
waiver of the right to a class action generally is a different question.  No state yet has at-
tempted to do so, and perhaps with good reason.  Perhaps state legislatures and society want to
preserve the right of parties to waive the right to class representation in exchange for lower
consumer product prices, or facilitated individual representation.
37 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003).
38 See id. If the primary question is always governed by the parties’ intent, one would
assume the parties could draft an arbitration provision stating that questions of enforceability
are always questions for an arbitrator to determine.  But the remaining issue is whether there
are some issues that courts assume parties always intended the court to decide, such as issues
regarding the arbitration provision’s validity and scope, regardless of contractual language to
the contrary.
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as those concerning the arbitration procedural mechanisms,39 the applica-
bility of certain contract defenses (waiver, delay, etc.),40 the interpreta-
tion of certain terms in the arbitration agreement,41 or even a contest to
the overall contract,42 are questions that the arbitrator should decide.  If
the contest to the arbitration agreement is based on the enforceability of a
class arbitration waiver—i.e., a procedural mechanism43—the determi-
nation of the validity of this measure should arguably be left to the arbi-
trator to decide.  In other words, because the contest is not to the
arbitration agreement, but to the interpretation of a procedural mecha-
nism within the agreement, the matter should proceed to arbitration.  But
no court thus far has adopted this interpretation of the arbitrability
analysis.44
39 Id. at 452 (holding that the determination of whether an arbitration agreement permits
class arbitration is to be determined by arbitrator, not the court).
40 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (“[P]rocedural ques-
tions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for
the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.  So, too, the presumption is that the arbitrator should
decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
41 Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406 (2003) (determining the ques-
tion of whether the exclusion of punitive damages renders an arbitration agreement unenforce-
able is a question for an arbitrator to determine).
42 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006). (“[A]s a matter
of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder
of the contract,” thus, if the defense is to the contract as whole, as opposed to the arbitration
agreement alone, the validity of the contract is a matter for the arbitrator, not the court, to
determine).
43 See, e.g., Blaz v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 504–05 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no substan-
tive right to a class remedy; a class action is a procedural device” that does not “‘alter the
parties’ burdens of proof, right to a jury trial, or the substantive prerequisites to recovery under
a given tort’” (quoting Southwestern Ref. Co., Inc. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Tex.
2000))).
44 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Litig., 554 F. 3d 300, 311–12 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
enforceability of class action waiver in arbitration clause was a “challenge to the arbitration
clause itself,” and therefore, a gateway issue of judicial interpretation (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Gay v. Creditinform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007) (deciding issue of enforceability
of class action waiver with no discussion of whether it is a gateway issue); Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that none of the plaintiffs’ claims
presented clear questions of arbitrability, but deciding that the court should determine the
enforceability of the class arbitration waiver because class representation was clearly prohib-
ited which directly implicated the enforceability of the arbitration agreement); Shroyer v. New
Cingular Wireless Servs. Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007) (deciding that the class action
waiver, and the attendant arbitration clause were unenforceable without addressing the issue of
arbitrability); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d 868, 877 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the issue of the enforcement of the class action waiver “may be decided by federal court”
because it attacks the validity of the arbitration agreement). But see Anderson v. Comcast
Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the class arbitration waiver applied “unless
[state] laws provide otherwise,” and the statute under which the plaintiffs asserted their claims
provided for the class mechanism.  The issue of interpreting the applicability of the class arbi-
tration waiver is not a gateway issue for a court to decide).
\\server05\productn\C\CJP\18-2\CJP204.txt unknown Seq: 12  6-JUL-09 15:21
488 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:477
Given the schism between the Supreme Court’s question-of-arbi-
trability analysis and its implementation by the state and federal courts in
order to address the procedural issue of the class arbitration waiver, one
might wonder why courts are taking it upon themselves to decide.  One
answer is precedent.  In Green Tree Financial Company-Alabama v.
Randolph,45 the Court decided a similar issue regarding whether a plain-
tiff would be deprived of her opportunity to vindicate statutory rights due
to potentially high arbitration costs.46  The Court held that the plaintiff
had not met her burden of showing prohibitive costs without addressing
whether the “prohibitive costs” contest should be determined by the arbi-
trator in the first instance.47  In subsequent years, courts faced with ad-
dressing the question of whether the class arbitration waiver presents a
prohibitive costs problem have relied on Randolph in determining that
this issue is in the proper province of the court.48  A second reason courts
may be deciding the issue is one of practicality.  Some arbitration ser-
vices have explicit mandates that would effectively bar them from decid-
ing the validity of a class arbitration waiver, thereby leaving the courts as
the sole available authority.49  The final, and perhaps best reason, is that
in some cases the validity of the arbitration agreement does depend, in
some sense, on the enforcement of the class arbitration waiver.50  For
example, many arbitration clauses in consumer-products agreements
state that if the class waiver is found unenforceable, then the entire arbi-
tration agreement is unenforceable.51  Thus, when the class arbitration
45 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
46 Id. at 90–91.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d at 55.  But reliance on Randolph in this arena is mis-
placed. Bazzle was decided three years after Randolph and established that the question of
whether an arbitration agreement permits a class arbitration is a procedural matter for the
arbitrator to decide.  Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003).
49 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July
14, 2005), http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).  The AAA
Policy states:
The Association is not currently accepting for administration demands for class arbi-
tration where the underlying agreement prohibits class claims, consolidation or join-
der, unless an order of a court directs the parties to the underlying dispute to submit
any aspect of their dispute involving class claims, consolidation, joinder or the en-
forceability of such provisions, to an arbitrator or to the Association.
Id.
50 Of course, the response to this argument is that because the class arbitration waiver is
a procedural measure, its enforcement is an issue for the arbitrator to decide, and whether the
arbitration agreement stands or falls based on that decision similarly becomes within the prov-
ince of the arbitrator.  This was the result of the Court’s decision in Pacificare Health Sys.,
Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406–07 (2003).
51 For example, Dell Corp. requires binding arbitration and a non-severable class waiver
in connection with its retail computer sales:
NEITHER CUSTOMER NOR DELL SHALL BE ENTITLED TO JOIN OR CON-
SOLIDATE CLAIMS BY OR AGAINST OTHER CUSTOMERS, OR ARBI-
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waiver is nonseverable from the arbitration agreement, it is at least argu-
able that the gateway issue of the validity of the arbitration clause is
dependent on the enforceability of the class action waiver.52  Whatever
the reason, courts are deciding the issue of class-arbitration-waiver en-
forceability, which leads to the second, more important issue of whether
an arbitration provision with the class waiver can, or should be, enforced.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS WITH
CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS
Disputes as to the enforcement of class arbitration waivers in the
context of consumer products generally come in two flavors: unconscio-
nability and vindication of statutory rights.  Although the two defenses
are commonly considered interchangeably,53 the nature of the elements
involved when properly applied has made the vindication-of-statutory-
rights defense more threatening to the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments with class waivers.
A. The Unconscionability Defense
Unconscionability, a general state law defense to contracts, became
the defense of choice in early cases contesting arbitration clauses in em-
TRATE ANY CLAIM AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS ACTION OR IN A
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL CAPACITY.  The individual (non-class) nature
of this dispute provision goes to the essence of the parties’ arbitration agreement,
and if found unenforceable, the entire arbitration provision shall not be enforced.
Dell’s Online Policies, Terms and Conditions of Sale § 12, http://www.dell.com (follow
“Terms of Sale” at bottom of page) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).  For similar non-severability
clauses, see Time Warner Cable Residential Services Subscriber Agreement, § 14, http://help.
twcable.com/html/twc_sub_agreement.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (“If any portion of this
section is held to be unenforceable, the remainder shall continue to be enforceable, except that
if the prohibition against consolidated or class action arbitrations set forth above is found to be
unenforceable, then the entirety of this arbitration clause shall be null and void.”), and T-
Mobile Terms & Conditions § 2, http://www.t-mobile.com (follow “Terms & Conditions”
hyperlink at bottom of page) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (“If a court or arbitrator determines in a
claim between you and us that your waiver of any ability to participate in class or representa-
tive actions is unenforceable under applicable law, the arbitration agreement will not apply
. . . .”).  See also, Mark J. Levin, Drafting a “Bulletproof” Arbitration Agreement and Related
Practice Issues, Presentation for CLE Teleconference: Class Action Arbitration Clauses Under
Fire: Crafting Agreements to Withstand Court Scrutiny (May 16, 2007) (advising that the
“arbitration clause should state that if the class action waiver is found to be unenforceable, the
entire arbitration provision fails”).
52 Although there are arguments in favor of a court deciding the enforceability of a class
arbitration waiver, the better result, and the one adopted by the Court in Pacificare, is that the
procedural question is one for the arbitrator to decide.  Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book,
538 U.S. 401, 406 (2003).
53 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60 n.22 (“[T]he unconscionability analysis always includes an
element that is the essence of the vindication of statutory rights analysis—the frustration of the
right to pursue claims granted by statute.”).
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ployment or consumer agreements.54  The basic concept of unconsciona-
bility, as explained in the Official Comment to Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-302, is “whether, in the light of the general commercial back-
ground and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”55  The
unconscionability doctrine, of course, usually involves a now rudimen-
tary two-pronged approach.  The arbitration clause contestant must prove
that the clause was either procedurally unconscionable or substantively
unconscionable, and in most states, both.  Procedural unconscionability
focuses on the formation of the agreement; substantive unconscionability
focuses on the actual terms of the agreement.56  In both analyses, how-
ever, the crucial vantage point is viewing the fairness of the contract
“under circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract.”57
Defenses to arbitration agreements, in particular those with class
action waivers, via the unconscionability rhetoric obtained only minimal
victories at the early stages of these battles.58  However, California
54 See Gilles, supra note 2, at 399 (“Plaintiffs challenging collective action waivers
looked first to the common law contract doctrine of unconscionability.”); Susan Randall, Judi-
cial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV.
185, 194–95 (2004) (postulating that in 2002–2003 68.5 percent of cases raised unconsciona-
bility as a defense involved arbitration agreements); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbi-
tration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 265 (2006) (“Unconscionability is the contract-law ground on
which courts most often rely in denying enforcement to adhesive arbitration agreements.”);
Wood, supra note 22, at 407–08 (recognizing the “rhetoric of unconscionability” as a major
theme in arbitration-clause defense).
55 U.C.C. § 2-302 official cmt. (2003) (“The principle is one of the prevention of oppres-
sion and unfair surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.”);  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. b (1981) (“Traditionally,
a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if it was ‘such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other . . . .’”).
56 See generally WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10.
57 U.C.C. § 2-302 official cmt.; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. a
(1981) (“The determination that a contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the
light of its setting, purpose and effect.”); Ware, supra note 54, at 267 (“It is clear that a proper
application of the unconscionability doctrine involves an assessment of the contract ex ante,
rather than ex post.”).
58 The Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have refused to invalidate arbitra-
tion clauses with class action waivers due to a claim of unconscionability. See, e.g., Gay v.
Creditinform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d
868, 878 (11th Cir. 2005) (class action waiver not unconscionable); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin.,
Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claims that binding arbitration
would preclude them from vindicating statutory rights due to plaintiffs’ failure to offer specific
evidence of prohibitive costs and ordering individual arbitration); Snowden v. Checkpoint
Cashing Co., 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff’s unconscionability claim
that without the class action vehicle, she will be unable to maintain legal representation given
the small amount of individual damages).  Several state courts have followed this trend.
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courts (and federal courts applying California law), proved early on to be
much less hospitable to any form of class arbitration waiver.  In Szetela
v. Discover Bank,59 the California Court of Appeals held that an arbitra-
tion clause in a consumer credit-card agreement, waiving a right to par-
ticipate in a representative action or act as a class representative, was
“harsh and unfair to Discover customers who might be owed a relatively
small sum of money” and “serve[d] as a disincentive for Discover to
avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation in the
first place.”60  Since, according to the Szetela court, the clause exposed
Discover to only small amounts of damages on behalf of those consum-
ers who actually pursued arbitration (Szetela did in fact recover his $29
through arbitration),61 Discover’s allegedly bad business practices could
go unchecked.62  The Ninth Circuit adopted Szetela’s reasoning in 2003
in Ting v. AT&T,63 and the California Supreme Court relied heavily on
this reasoning in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,64 when it held:
We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessa-
rily unconscionable.  But when the waiver is found in a
consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which dis-
putes between the contracting parties predictably involve
small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that
the party with the superior bargaining power has carried
out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of con-
sumers out of individually small sums of money,
then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of
the party “from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or
willful injury to the person or property of another.”
Under these circumstances, such waivers are uncon-
scionable under California law and should not be
enforced.65
With the exception of California state courts and the federal courts
in the Ninth Circuit, most courts have rejected the idea that binding indi-
59 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
60 Id. at 868.  The court held the agreement also exhibited procedural unconscionability,
rejecting Discover’s argument that the availability of similar goods or services elsewhere re-
duced the adhesiveness of the contract, by focusing on the fact that the plaintiff was presented
with the arbitration agreement on a “take it or leave it” basis “without opportunity for mean-
ingful negotiation.” Id. at 867.
61 Id. at 865.
62 Id. at 868 (“By imposing this clause on it customers, Discover has essentially granted
itself a license to push the boundaries of good business practices to their furthest limits, fully
aware that relatively few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies, and that any remedies
obtained will pertain to that single customer without collateral estoppel effect.”).
63 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003).
64 113 P.3d 1100, 1107 (Cal. 2005).
65 Id. at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2009)) (internal citation omitted).
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vidual arbitration is “so one-sided and unfair” as to be unconscionable.66
In recent years, however, state courts and some federal courts have
stricken arbitration agreements under the rhetoric of unconscionability.67
The popularity of the defense is catching on, particularly when intermin-
gled or confused with the vindication-of-statutory-rights defense.68
B. The Corollary to Unconscionability: Vindication of Statutory
Rights
A close corollary to the unconscionability defense is the argument
that some class arbitration waivers are invalid because they render a
party to the agreement unable to vindicate his statutory rights.69  Despite
early courts clearly rejecting the theory, the “vindication of statutory
rights” analysis appears to be the new front-runner in attacking otherwise
valid arbitration clauses.70  A closer look at the origins of the vindica-
66 See, e.g., Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2004)
(applying Texas law in finding that a class action waiver was not unconscionable).  Many
courts in this context have failed to draw the distinction between viewing the fairness of the
arbitration’s terms at the time of its making as is required by the traditional unconscionability
analysis, see Ware, supra note 54 and accompanying text, and instead, have focused on
whether the plaintiff’s predicament at presently being forced to arbitrate his particular claim is
ex post unconscionable in light of potential costs involved.  Nevertheless, those courts to ini-
tially address the issue under the unconscionability analysis still refused to find them so op-
pressive as to require that they not be enforced. See supra note 58.
67 See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007); Kinkel v.
Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000,
1009 (Wash. 2007).
68 By focusing on the claimant’s ability to vindicate statutory rights in the unconsciona-
bility analysis, a court will improperly view the fairness of the terms of the contract as they
exist after the dispute has arisen, as opposed to the fairness of the terms as they existed at the
time the parties entered the agreement.  For example, in Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois explained that its doctrine of substantive unconscionability as applied
to a case involving class action waivers required analysis of:
. . .  [W]hether a waiver of the ability to bring a class claim is so onerous or
oppressive that it is substantively unconscionable when: (1) the waiver is contained
in a contract that contains a mandatory arbitration provision, but does not reveal the
cost of arbitration to the claim, (2) the cost will be $125, and (3) the underlying
claim involves actual damages of $150.
The nature of the underlying claim is also relevant to this inquiry. . . .
. . . .
. . . Thus, when considering the cost-price disparity factor of substantive uncon-
scionability, we must consider that the cost to the plaintiff of attempting to vindicate
her $150 claim, in the absence of the ability to bring a class claim, would be $125
plus her attorney fees.  As a result, if she were to prevail on the merits of her claim
and be awarded $150 in damages, it is an absolute certainty that she would not be
made whole.
857 N.E.2d at 267–68 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
69 See e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006); Scott, 161 P.3d at
1006.
70 For courts rejecting the vindication-of-statutory-rights theory as a viable defense, see
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if plaintiffs who
sign valid arbitration agreements lack the procedural right to proceed as part of a class, they
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tion-of-statutory-rights defense, however, reveals that the courts invok-
ing this defense to invalidate some class arbitration waivers may be
missing the mark.
1. The Vindication-of-Statutory-Rights Trilogy
Ironically, the vindication-of-statutory-rights defense did not de-
velop as a defense to arbitration agreements, but rather as an implicit
recognition of the equality of the arbitral forum with the judicial forum.
The Supreme Court first used the “effectively vindicate” language in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,71 a case con-
cerning the applicability (and enforcement) of an arbitration agreement
between a domestic corporation and an international corporation with re-
spect to domestic antitrust claims.72  The jurisprudence at that time was
that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were unenforceable with respect
to domestic antitrust claims,73 and in Mitsubishi Motors Corp., the First
retain the full range of rights created by the TILA.”); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala.,
244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] contractual provision to arbitrate TILA claims is
enforceable even if it precludes a plaintiff from utilizing class action procedures in vindicating
statutory rights under TILA”); and Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir.
2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims that binding arbitration would preclude them from vindi-
cating statutory rights due to the plaintiffs’ failure to offer specific evidence of prohibitive
costs and ordering individual arbitration).
71 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
72 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese automobile manufacturer, entered into an
agreement with Soler Chrysler-Plymouth that provided for the direct sales of Mitsubishi prod-
ucts to Soler and allowed Soler, a Chrysler dealer, to sell and market these Mitsubishi products
in Puerto Rico.  Id. at 617.  The sales agreement also provided for mandatory arbitration of all
disputes arising out of the agreement. Id.  The arbitration was required to proceed in Japan
pursuant to the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Id. Mitsubishi brought
an action against Soler in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
seeking to compel arbitration of breach-of-contract claims in accordance with the Sales Agree-
ment. Id. at 618–19.  Soler denied the allegations in Mitsubishi’s complaint, and counter-
claimed against both Mitsubishi and its co-defendant, alleging various breach-of-contract
claims by Mitsubishi, defamation claims, and statutory claims, including a cause of action
under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 619–20.
73 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that rights conferred
under federal antitrust laws were “of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration”
in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968).
The other circuits uniformly adopted this holding. See, e.g., Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v.
Cont’l Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment when antitrust issues permeate the case); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing exception for post-dispute arbitration agreements); Helfenbein v. Int’l Indus., 438
F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto, Co., 396 F.2d 710,
715–16 (9th Cir. 1968).  Each of these cases prohibiting the arbitration of domestic antitrust
claims, of course, was impliedly overturned by Mitsubishi and Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (reversing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and
holding that pre–dispute arbitration agreements covering claims arising under §14 of the Se-
curities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77, are enforceable because “Wilko is pervaded by . . . ‘the old
judicial hostility to arbitration.’” (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942))).
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Circuit held that this policy was valid even in the wake of an interna-
tional agreement.74  The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the case
“primarily to consider whether an American court should enforce an
agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement
arises from an international transaction,”75 but the Court’s decision had
implications beyond the international-arbitration-agreement context.
a. Vindication of statutory rights: A judicially created
defense
Before addressing the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust claims in
the international context, the Court discussed defendant Soler’s conten-
tion that a court may not construe an arbitration agreement to reach statu-
tory claims unless the party that the statute was designed to protect
expressly agreed to arbitrate those statutory claims.76  Relying on prior
precedent requiring the Court to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate,”77 the Court stated, “[A]s with any other contract, the parties’ in-
tentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to
issues of arbitrability.”78  The Court then rejected any basis for departing
from the federal substantive law favoring arbitration to create a judicial
exception to arbitration for claims founded on statutory rights.79  Al-
though the Court did not foreclose the idea that statutory claims may ever
be excluded from the realm of arbitrability, it held that an explicit Con-
74 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 169 (1st Cir.
1983).  The First Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the international character of
the Mitsubishi-Soler agreement required enforcement of the arbitration agreement, despite
contrary circuit court authority. Id.  It held that the “nonarbitrability of antitrust issues is alive,
well, [and] justified both in its conception and in its application,” even as to international
agreements. Id. at 163.  The court set forth four rationales for this “judicially created” excep-
tion for antitrust claims from the strong policy in favor of arbitration governed by the FAA: (1)
private parties play an intrinsic role in aiding government enforcement of the antitrust laws via
the private action with treble damages, of which judicial action is an indispensable ingredient;
(2) the “strong possibility” that contracts which generate antitrust disputes may be contracts of
adhesion; (3) antitrust issues are “‘prone to be complicated, and the evidence extensive and
diverse;’” and (4) antitrust issues are “too important to be lodged in arbitrators chosen from
the business community—particularly those from a foreign community that has had no experi-
ence with or exposure to our law and values.” Id. at 162.  These arguments are remarkably
similar to those voiced in opposition to permitting class arbitration waivers in the context of
consumer products or employment agreements.
75 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624.
76 Id. at 626.
77 Id. at 626 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
78 Id.
79 The Court acknowledged that agreements to arbitrate may be revoked on the same
grounds as those that would require the revocation of any contract, such as fraud or over-
whelming economic power, but it stated that “absent such considerations, the [FAA] provides
no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise
hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.” Id.
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gressional intention to exclude the statutory claim from the ambit of the
FAA must be evident.80
The Court’s reasoning for the express-exclusion requirement pro-
vides the basis for modern-day vindication-of-statutory-rights attacks on
arbitration clauses: “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”81
Because the protected party’s substantive rights under the statute are pre-
served and capable of vindication in the arbitral forum, the party has only
“trad[ed] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”82
Turning to the arbitrability of antitrust issues between a domestic
and an international party, the Court held that rules of international com-
ity, The Arbitration Convention, and the presumption in favor of enforce-
ment of freely negotiated, contractual choice-of-forum provisions
outweighed judicial protectionism of antitrust claims.83  The Court reiter-
ated that a party resisting arbitration may directly attack the arbitration
clause if enforcement would be “‘unreasonable and unjust or [if] pro-
ceedings in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and incon-
venient that [the resisting party] will for all practical purposes be
deprived of his day in court.”84
The Court also rejected the proposition that an arbitration proceed-
ing would pose innate hostility to the free-market ideal of competition:
“We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.”85  Finally, the Court rejected
the public policy suggestion that the importance of the private litigant,
80 Id. at 627.  Of course, parties to the agreement could always draft an arbitration agree-
ment excluding all or some statutory claims.
81 Id. at 628.
82 Id.
83 Regarding American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d
Cir. 1968), and the four doctrinal rationales distilled by the First Circuit with skepticism, the
Court found the second rationale—the possibility that contracts which generate antitrust issues
may be contracts of adhesion—unjustified. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632.  With respect to the
third rationale—the judicial retention rationale (based on the complexity of the law and the
proof)—the Court adhered to the view that “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks
of arbitration” and that parties are free to take into account the complexity of the issue when
appointing the arbitrators. Id. at 633.  In addition, the Court noted that at the time of the
contract, the parties when contracting, mutually preferred a procedure that would produce
“streamlined proceedings and expeditious results”—a preference that would be well-served by
reduced complexity. Id.  The Court also recognized that most lower courts following the
American Safety doctrine were quite willing to enforce post-dispute agreements to arbitrate
antitrust issues regardless of levels of complexity. Id.
84 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
85 Id. at 634.
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aided by the promise of treble damages, to promoting the enforcement of
antitrust laws could remove antitrust claims from the arbitral sphere.86
Although the clear import of the treble damages provision is to enable an
injured competitor to gain remedial damages,87 the cause of action re-
mains at all times under the control of the individual: no citizen is re-
quired to bring an antitrust suit, and no citizen is prohibited from settling
an antitrust suit for less than full value.88  Thus, a prospective litigant
may provide in advance for a mutually agreeable procedure to settle his
controversies, including his antitrust claims.89  The cornerstone of the
Court’s theory was based on this premise: “[S]o long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbi-
tral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deter-
rent function.”90  Thus, in a case intended to cast arbitration, even of
remedial statutes, on equal or more favorable footing as the judicial fo-
rum, the Court crafted language that would soon give rise to a method for
invalidating arbitration agreements.
b. Mitsubishi’s legacy: Arbitrating employment
discrimination claims
Mitsubishi laid the cornerstone for the Court’s sheltered fostering of
arbitration agreements.  In the years following Mitsubishi, the Court held
enforceable arbitration agreements arising out of various protective stat-
utes such as § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,91 the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),92 and § 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 193393.  The next progression in the evolution of the
vindication-of-statutory-rights defense came in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp.,94 another pro-arbitration case, holding enforceable
86 Id. at 636.
87 The Court recounted the legislative history of § 4 of the Clayton Act which, when
reenacted in 1914, was still “‘conceived primarily as open[ing] the door of justice to every
man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and [giving] the
injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.’” Id. at 636 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n. 10 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88 Id. at 636.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 637 (emphasis added).  The Court’s focus on the prospective litigant in this
language should not be overlooked.  So long as the parties, at the time of drafting the arbitra-
tion agreement, are not foreclosed of the opportunity to vindicate statutory rights by choosing
the arbitral forum (and it is hard to see how they would be), the arbitration agreement should
be upheld regardless of the parties’ changed circumstances in light of post-contractual litiga-
tion.  Thus, like the unconscionability analysis, the Court’s focus under a vindication-of-statu-
tory-rights analysis should be guided by the ex ante position of the parties.
91 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
92 Id. at 242.
93 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
94 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991).
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an arbitration agreement to handle disputes arising under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
The Gilmer plaintiff contended that claims arising under the ADEA
were unsuitable for arbitration because the ADEA was designed to ad-
dress important social policies in addition to individual grievances.95  Af-
ter recognizing Mitsubishi’s holding that the arbitral forum is an equal, if
not better, forum for furthering broad social purposes, the Court reiter-
ated, “So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or
her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”96
Part of Gilmer’s argument that arbitration procedures could not ade-
quately further the purposes of the ADEA was based on the fact that the
procedures did not provide for class actions or broad equitable relief.
The Court disagreed that this procedural inconsistency rendered arbitra-
tion irreconcilable with the ADEA, noting that arbitrators do have the
power to fashion equitable relief and that the arbitration rules at issue
also provided for collective proceedings.  But the Court noted, “even if
the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could
not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the
possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean individual at-
tempts at conciliation were intended to be barred.”97  Thus, the Court
impliedly recognized that an employee still maintains the ability to effec-
tively vindicate his or her statutory rights under the ADEA in the arbitral
forum even if that forum results in the waiver of the opportunity to bring
a class action.
c. Drafting a defense: Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama
v. Randolph
Although the Court mentioned the litigants’ opportunity to “effec-
tively . . . vindicate” statutory rights in both Mitsubishi and Gilmer, it
95 Id. at 27.
96 Id. at 28. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985) (alterations in original)).  In contrast to Mitsubishi, which involved an agree-
ment between two commercial organizations, Gilmer involved an agreement between an em-
ployee and employer.  Nonetheless, the Court found the distinction irrelevant, stating that
“[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.” Id.  at 33.  The Court reminded
other courts to “remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate re-
sulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for
the revocation of any contract.’”  Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).  The Court, how-
ever, found no such proof in this case. Id.
97 Id. at 32 (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int’l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Becker, J., dissenting).  Any concerns about relinquishing class relief through binding arbitra-
tion were lessened by the Court’s recognition that arbitration agreements do not preclude the
EEOC from bringing actions that seek class-wide and equitable relief. Id.
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was in the context of recognizing the arbitral forum as equally adequate
to a judicial forum for the vindication of those rights as the judicial fo-
rum.  It was not until Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Ran-
dolph98 that the opportunity—or purported lack thereof—to vindicate
statutory rights based on prohibitive costs was presented to the Court as a
defense to arbitration.  Plaintiff Randolph filed class claims under the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts, and
defendant Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a binding
arbitration agreement.99  The plaintiff contended that the arbitration
agreement’s silence as to costs and fees created a risk that she would be
required to pay prohibitive arbitration costs if relegated to the arbitral
forum, forcing her to forgo any statutory claims she possessed.100  Plac-
ing the burden of proof of prohibitive costs on the plaintiff, the Court
held that given the arbitration agreement’s silence as to costs and the
absence of reliable evidence in the record as to what her costs would be,
she had not carried that burden.101  But the Court did not completely
foreclose the possibility of an “effectively vindicate” defense, stating: “It
may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a
litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statu-
tory rights in the arbitral forum.”102  This recognition that costs could, if
properly and conclusively proven, form a defense to an arbitration clause
laid the foundation for a new strategy in the anti-arbitration defense.
98 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
99 Although the arbitration agreement apparently did not expressly preclude class arbitra-
tion, the Court did not address this argument, nor did it address the propriety of class arbitra-
tion. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003), in which the Court held that
the arbitrator must decide whether the arbitration agreement permits class arbitration when
silent with respect thereto, was not decided until three years later.
100 Neither party disputed the arbitration clause’s applicability to all claims, even statu-
tory claims, arising under the contract, and Ms. Randolph did not contend that the TILA
evinces a clear intention by Congress to preclude waiver of judicial (or class) remedies. Ran-
dolph, 531 U.S. at 90.
101 Id. at 92.
102 Id.  The Court declined to address the plaintiff’s contention that the arbitration agree-
ment was unenforceable because it prevented her from bringing her TILA claims as a class
action because the court of appeals had not yet decided on that issue. Id. at 92 n.7.  The Court
also did not address the underlying question of whether the vindication-of-statutory-rights is-
sue is a question of arbitrability reserved for a court to determine, or whether it is a matter for
the arbitrator to decide.  On the one hand, if the existence of prohibitive arbitration costs did
actually deprive a plaintiff of her opportunity to effectively vindicate statutory rights, the arbi-
tration agreement would be unenforceable, and hence, a question for the court to decide in the
first instance. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006).
On the other hand, if the crux of vindication-of-statutory-rights argument is based on an inter-
pretation of the procedures and penalties available in the arbitration procedures, such as limits
on discovery, costs, and damages, the question should be for the arbitrator to decide. See
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 (holding that the arbitrator should decide procedural gateway matters,
such as whether an arbitration clause permits a class action).
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d. The Mitsubishi trilogy summarized
Three main principles can be gleaned from Mitsubishi and its prog-
eny.  First, absent an explicit expression from Congress that it intends the
substantive protection afforded by the statute to include prohibiting the
waiver of a judicial forum, the statutory claim will be facially arbitra-
ble.103  Second, by agreeing to arbitration, a party does not relinquish the
substantive protection of the statute.  Much like the operation of a spe-
cialized forum selection clause, the party has simply agreed to the adjudi-
cation of his rights in an arbitral, rather than judicial forum.104  Finally,
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent purposes.”105  In particular, the third prin-
ciple prompted the use of the defense based on prohibitive costs against
the enforcement of the class arbitration waiver.106
2. Contemporary Usage of the Vindication-of-Statutory-Rights
Analysis
Drawing on Mitsubishi, the Randolph Court contemplated whether
an arbitration clause may be rendered invalid if the proven costs are so
prohibitive as to prevent the litigant from affording him or herself of the
statutory protection.107  But Randolph also recognized that the burden of
proof is on the party resisting arbitration.108  How much proof is neces-
sary before the opposing party can succeed on a cost-based, vindication-
103 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985);
see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (noting that the
burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show “that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims”); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)
(“If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim,
such an intent will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history, or from an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  To date, the Court has never found a Congressional intent to preclude a
waiver of the judicial forum from any contested remedial statute. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.  The
three potential areas for the Court to discern such an intent are from the text, legislative his-
tory, or an “inherent conflict” between the arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.
Id.  It is in this third area that the controversy typically arises. Id.  Of course, this premise does
not foreclose any party from contractually exempting statutory claims from arbitration. See,
e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
104 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
105 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
106 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 319 (2d Cir. 2009)
(relying on Mitsubishi to hold that the class arbitration waiver precluded the vindication of
antitrust claims when the cost of  litigating individual claims exceeded estimated individual
recovery).
107 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
108 Id.
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of-statutory-rights claim?109  And how much expense to be incurred is
prohibitive?110  Is the prohibitive-cost analysis always dependent on the
amount of damages at stake, or the plaintiff’s subjective capability to
pay?  If it is, are plaintiffs deprived of their opportunity to vindicate stat-
utory rights in the presence of court filing fees?111  The Randolph Court
declined to answer these questions, concluding that the plaintiff did not
timely produce evidence substantiating the costs she would incur as to
merit consideration.112
In addressing the question of cost-prohibitive arbitration in light of a
class arbitration waiver, other courts have been increasingly likely to as-
sume that consumers will forgo small recovery claims absent the class
mechanism.113  For example, in Kristian v. Comcast Corp., the court
held that the plaintiffs would be prohibited from vindicating their anti-
trust claims through individual arbitration for three reasons: (1) the com-
109 Compare Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding plain-
tiffs had proven prohibitive costs when plaintiffs produced unopposed expert affidavits
describing the elaborate factual inquiry required to litigate antitrust claims and expert witness
fees ranging upwards from $300,000), with Fiser v. Dell Comp. Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 348
(N.M. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008) (holding plaintiff’s contention that
“common sense dictates that consumers do not hire lawyers to privately arbitrate claims for
amounts in the neighborhood of $5–$100,” insufficient, in the absence of other evidence of
costs, to prove that the plaintiff faced prohibitive costs).
110 See, e.g., Adler v. Dell, Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL 5351042, at 8–9 (E.D.
Mich. Dec 18, 2008) (holding that the potential statutory recovery of $250 plus attorney fees
was sufficient to overcome the argument that without class certification, the plaintiff would be
effectively prohibited from pursuing the claim).
111 See, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 275 (Ill. 2006) (“[T]he en-
forceability of a class action waiver, whether or not the contract provides for mandatory arbi-
tration, must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the total of the circumstances.
Relevant circumstances include . . . the cost of vindicating the claim relative to the amount of
damages that might be awarded under the dispute resolution provisions of the contract.”).
112 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92.  Randolph had, however, presented some evidence—albeit
in an untimely manner. Id. at 91.  In her motion for reconsideration in the district court,
Randolph alleged that if the arbitration proceeded before the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, the combined fees would be $500 for claims under $10,000, not including the cost of the
arbitrator or administrative fees. Id. at 91 n.6.  The plaintiff also produced scant, indirect
evidence that the arbitral fee could be $700 per day. Id.  The Court rejected these “unsup-
ported statements” because the plaintiff failed to show that the AAA would conduct the arbi-
tration proceeding (the agreement was silent with respect to arbitration services) or that she
would be charged the complete filing fee and arbitrator’s fee she identified. Id.
113 See e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d 25; Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash.
2007).  No court to date has analyzed the bargain to waive potential recovery of small dollar
amounts via the class mechanism in exchange for a relatively cheap, perhaps free, and stream-
lined proceeding to recover more substantial claims that would still be unworthy of litigating
on an individual basis through a judicial forum.  The court in Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank,
225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2000), came close however, by recognizing that class actions do
not necessarily give plaintiffs better incentives to bring private enforcement actions: “The
sums available in recovery to individual plaintiffs are not automatically increased by use of the
class forum.  Indeed individual plaintiff recoveries available in a class action may be lower
than those possible in individual suits because the recovery under TILA’s statutory cap is
spread over the entire class.”
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plexity of litigating an antitrust case which involves an “elaborate factual
inquiry;”114 (2) the excessive costs of expert fees, which the plaintiffs’
economists estimated to be between $300,000 and $600,000;115 and (3)
the lack of a monetary incentive to encourage attorney representation in
individual antitrust arbitration.116  The plaintiffs estimated the individual
recovery per class member ranged from a few hundred dollars to a few
thousand dollars.117  The Kristian court failed to recognize that even if
individual claims could not be aggregated in a formal class proceeding
pursuant to the arbitration agreement, nothing prevented the plaintiffs—
and their attorneys—from informally coordinating efforts on factual dis-
covery, expert witnesses, and litigation preparation to defray costs.  Set-
ting aside this oversight, the Kristian holding can basically be attributed
to a lack of incentives for (1) the consumer to pursue low-dollar claims,
and (2) attorneys to represent consumers in connection with low-dollar
claims.  The result of this lack of incentives, according to the Kristian
court, is that:
Comcast [would] be essentially shielded from private
consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases
where it has violated the law.  Plaintiffs will be unable to
vindicate their statutory rights.  Finally, the social goals
of federal and state antitrust laws will be frustrated be-
cause of the “enforcement gap” created by the de facto
liability shield.118
Similarly, in Scott v. Cingular Wireless,119 the Washington Supreme
Court applied a vindication-of-statutory-rights analysis under the guise of
114 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58. But see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985) (noting that at the time of the arbitration agreement the
parties mutually preferred a procedure that would produce streamlined proceedings and expe-
ditious results—a preference that would be well-served by the reduced complexity of arbitra-
tion, even as it pertains to antitrust claims).
115 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58.  Similarly, in In re American Express Merchants’ Litig., 554
F.3d 300, 317–18 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit relied on Kristian and found a class
arbitration waiver unenforceable based on expert testimony that the antitrust claims could
range from several hundred thousand dollars to over a million dollars, and that the median
plaintiff’s recovery, when trebled, averaged approximately $5,252.
116 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 & n.21.  The Kristian court recognized that antitrust statutes
provide for an award of attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs. Id.  But it reasoned that, aside
from being a poor investment, “being made whole is hardly a sufficient incentive for an attor-
ney to invest in a case such as this when time spent on more predictable cases would be
advantageous, and frankly, rational.” Id.
117 Id. at 54.
118 Id. at 61.  The response to the Kristian court’s vindication-of-statutory-rights decision
based on the consumer’s lack of incentives is that it would be entirely reasonable for the
prospective litigant to relinquish the right or capability to litigate expensive, complex claims
with a proportionally small payoff in exchange for the opportunity to cost-effectively arbitrate
more substantial claims with a proportionally advantageous payoff.
119 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007).
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unconscionability.  The court held that the class arbitration waiver is un-
conscionable because it “effectively denies plaintiffs a forum to vindicate
the consumer protections guaranteed by Washington law and effectively
exculpates its drafter from liability for a broad range of wrongful con-
duct.”120  Notably, the Scott arbitration clause involved a second-genera-
tion arbitration clause,121 in which Cingular agreed to pay all costs of the
arbitration, unless the consumer’s claim was found to be frivolous.  In
addition, Cingular agreed to pay the consumer’s reasonable attorney fees
and expenses incurred in the arbitration if the consumer recovered at
least the demand amount.122  Even with these “laudable” provisions,123
by which a consumer could arbitrate a legitimate dispute essentially for
free, the Washington Supreme Court held it would be “impracticable to
pursue on an individual basis” low-value claims.124  Because the con-
sumers were not likely to pursue low-value claims individually, and in-
stead, according to the Scott court, would forgo the claim altogether, the
individual consumer would have “far less” ability to vindicate the Wash-
ington Consumer Protection Act without the class mechanism.125  Since
the removal of the class mechanism would result in some low-dollar
claims going unlitigated, it effectively exculpated Cingular from liability
for “any wrong where the cost of pursuit outweighs the potential amount
of recovery.”126  Like Kristian, the Scott court’s decision came down to
one of incentives—without the class mechanism, how can courts guaran-
tee that consumers will bring meritorious claims, even if for minimal
recovery amounts?  Again, we see courts acting as the surrogate mouth-
piece for the consumer, demanding what, in that court’s view, the reason-
120 Id. at 1009.
121 See infra Part III.B.
122 Scott, 161 P.3d at 1009.
123 Id. at 1007.
124 Id. The Scott plaintiffs alleged that Cingular had overcharged them between $1 and
$45 per month by unlawfully adding roaming and hidden charges. Id. at 1002.  The court did
not estimate the maximum value of any individual plaintiff’s claim. Id.
125 Id. at 1009. Of course, the court did not, and could not hold, that the consumers had
been deprived of any opportunity to vindicate their state consumer protection claims. See id.
Depending on the size of the demand and the likelihood of success, the consumer may have
been more successful in vindicating the CPA claims via arbitration instead of class litigation.
See id. Whether a state court could hold an arbitration agreement unenforceable because it
deprives the consumer of an opportunity to vindicate a state statutory right, as opposed to a
federal statutory right is not clear. See id.  The state law right is likely preempted by the FAA.
See Ware, supra note 54, at 270–71 (explaining that the “effectively vindicate” doctrine is not
a ground for permitting the revocation of “any contract” at common law, thus it is not a
permissible ground for denying enforcement of an arbitration contract permitted by FAA § 2
(internal quotations omitted)).  Regardless, here, the Washington Supreme Court construed the
reduced likelihood of consumers availing themselves of rights afforded by the state CPA as
substantively unconscionable, a general state law ground, and concluded that its decision was
not preempted by the FAA because it based its decision on the general state law ground of
unconscionability. Scott, 161 P.3d at 1008.
126 Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007.
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able consumer would demand in an arms-length negotiation over the
arbitration clause.  The Scott court concluded that the class mechanism is
the only practical mechanism to provide consumers with incentives to
assert low-value claims.127  Several courts in recent years have reached
similar conclusions.128  However, innovative arbitration-clause drafting
may prove them wrong.
III. THE EVOLVING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Myriam Gilles argues that the question of whether class action
waivers should be enforced “totally and inevitably collapses into the
question of whether class actions are a good thing or a bad thing.”129  But
must the issue be phrased in those simple terms?  In the years that have
passed since Gilles’s 2005 article, corporate America has evolved in re-
sponse to valid challenges to the class action bar.  Companies have de-
veloped new “consumer friendly” arbitration agreements that have the
potential to preserve the three goals of (1) streamlining consumer litiga-
tion, (2) providing an avenue for consumers to vindicate statutory rights
and recover on valid claims, and (3) providing an avenue for deterrence
through costly—although not as costly—arbitration.  What is occurring
is a dialogue between the consumer products industry and the consumer
(via the courts) in a process by which the arbitration agreement is evolv-
ing into an agreement that may eliminate the class action in many occa-
sions, but is advantageous to the individual consumer.  In other words,
corporate America is listening.
A. First-Generation Consumer Products Arbitration Clauses
The roots of the class arbitration waiver demonstrate its evolution-
ary process.  At the advent of the class action waiver,130 some avaricious
127 Id. at 1009 (“Where many customers of the same company have the same or similar
complaint and each is damaged a small amount, class action litigation or arbitration is the only
practical remedy available.”).
128
 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.
2007); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 275 (Ill. 2006) (holding that  an arbitra-
tion clause with a class waiver “creates a situation where the cost of vindicating the claim is so
high that the plaintiff’s only reasonable, cost-effective means of obtaining a complete remedy
is as either the representative or member of a class.”).  To say that the Ninth Circuit and
California’s hostility to the class arbitration waiver is recent is a bit of a mischaracterization.
See generally Ting v. AT&T, 310 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).  As discussed supra Part II.A., these courts have consistently re-
fused to uphold class arbitration waivers, regardless of the plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate statu-
tory rights in the arbitral forum, based on the view that the class waiver may operate as an
exculpatory clause. See generally Ting, 210 F.3d 1126; Discover, 113 P.3d 1100.
129 Gilles, supra note 2, at 429.
130 Gilles documents that the class action waiver began to be advocated in corporate coun-
sel trade journals in the late 1990s.  In the wake of Y2K, the movement “accelerated” when the
National Arbitration Forum cautioned corporate attorneys that “the only way to insulate their
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drafters included terms that excluded punitive damages and incidental or
consequential damages, prohibited attorneys fees, required the arbitration
to proceed in a location far from the consumer’s home, required the con-
sumer to pay half or sometimes all of the arbitration fees, imposed
mandatory confidentiality clauses, or gave the drafter the sole capability
of selecting the arbitrator.131  Each of these types of provisions has been
considered unenforceable by at least one court.132  In an effort to draft an
arbitration clause that would be enforceable, the consumer products in-
dustry has accommodated the judicial admonitions.  Current case law
documents the evolutionary process.133  Leading corporate counsel now
advise fairness to the consumer as a fundamental principle in consumer
arbitration-clause drafting.134  Moreover, the arbitration industry com-
mands it.
clients from class action liability in general—and Y2K computer class action liability,” was to
implement binding arbitration terms waiving the right to maintain a class action. Id. at 398.
131 See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing a forum selection clause requiring the California plaintiff to arbitrate in Boston uncon-
scionable); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d on other grounds,
319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a confidentiality provision unconscionable); In re Lu-
cas, 312 B.R. 407 (D. Nev. 2004) (holding a unilateral right to select an arbitrator substan-
tively unconscionable); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal Rptr. 3d 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding a requirement for upfront consumer arbitration fees unconscionable); Bellsouth Mo-
bility LLC v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a limitation of
liability to actual damages substantively unconscionable); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d
570, 576 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the limitation to actual damages); Swain v. Auto
Services, Inc., 128 S.W. 3d 103, 108–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing an arbitration clause
including a forum selection clause requiring arbitration in another state and precluding attor-
ney’s fees).
132 See, e.g., supra note 131.  But many of the provisions have been upheld by some
courts. See, e.g., Bragel v. Gen. Steel Corp., 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 408  at *5–6 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2006) (forum selection clause and limitation of liability clauses in arbitration agreement not
unconscionable).  Despite this lack of uniformity in condemnation, the consumer products in-
dustry has still attempted to overcome the defects identified by some courts.  And, in light of
the consumer products procedures required by the large arbitration services, the likelihood that
most of the more onerous provisions would be enforced is small. But see Stempel, supra note
2, at 417 (recognizing that “due process protocols have made a substantial step toward greater
fairness in mass arbitration,” but arguing that legislative or executive enforcement of procedu-
ral minimum standards is necessary because the protocols are “insufficiently clear and
directive”).
133 See, e.g., Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 257 (discussing Cingular’s second generation “con-
sumer-friendly” arbitration clause which offered to pay all arbitration costs if the consumer’s
claim was nonfrivolous, to reimburse reasonable attorney fees if the claimant recovered the
amount demanded, changed the location of the arbitration to the county of the claimant’s
billing address, and eliminated the confidentiality requirement (internal quotations omitted));
Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1003 (Wash. 2007) (documenting Cingular’s re-
vised arbitration clause which provided that Cingular would pay all filing, administrator, and
arbitration fees unless the customer’s claim was found to be frivolous, and holding that Cingu-
lar would reimburse the consumer reasonable attorney fees and expenses if the consumer re-
covered at least the demand amount).
134 Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements By Consumer
Financial Services Providers, Presentation for CLE Teleconference: Class Action Arbitration
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The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has implemented a
Consumer Due Process Protocol (Protocol) that attempts to require fun-
damental standards of fairness in the drafting and administration of arbi-
tration claims involving the consumer.135  In addition to setting forth
minimum standards of fairness in the arbitration proceedings, the Proto-
col requires Providers to take reasonable measures to provide Consumers
with “clear and adequate” notice of the ADR provision at the time the
consumer contracts for goods or services,136 to provide reasonable means
for obtaining additional information regarding the ADR program,137 to
reserve both parties’ rights to seek relief in small claims courts,138 to give
the Consumer an equal voice in arbitrator selection,139 and to provide
that face-to-face proceedings be conducted at a “reasonably convenient
location to both parties considering the parties’ ability to travel and other
circumstances.”140 The Protocol also instructs that each party must have
an ability to obtain information material to the dispute.141  Most impor-
tantly, the Protocol requires that the arbitrator’s capacity to grant relief
not be limited,142 and that Providers “develop ADR programs which en-
tail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the dis-
pute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim; the
nature of goods or services provided; and the ability of the Consumer to
pay.”143  Under the AAA’s Consumer Related Disputes Supplementary
Clauses Under Fire: Crafting Agreements to Withstand Court Scrutiny (May 16, 2007) (“My
message to clients: Draft a fair clause!”).  Kaplinsky further instructs practitioners to comply
with the consumer requirements of the AAA, JAMS, and the NAF, to make the arbitration
agreement mutually binding, and encourages drafters to agree to pay all arbitration fees other
than what a consumer would pay as a court filing fee or than what is waived by the arbitration
administrator, to give the consumers the option of rejecting the arbitration provision, and to
give the consumer the right to obtain reasonable attorney’s fees if he prevails. Id.
135 American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol (2007), http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019#SCOPE_OF_THE_CONSUMER_DUE_PROCESS_PROTOC
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009).  A consumer is defined as “an individual who purchases or leases
goods or services, or contracts to purchase or lease goods or services, intended primarily for
personal, family or household use.”  Id. at Glossary of Terms, Consumer.  A Provider is “a
seller or lessor of goods or services to Consumers for personal, family or household use.” Id.
at Glossary of Terms, Provider.  The Protocol was adopted with the realization that the major-
ity of consumer ADR clauses are offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis; thus the Protocol
attempts to establish a “baseline of reasonable expectations for ADR in Consumer Transac-
tions.” Id. at. Principle 1, Reporter’s Comments.
136 Id. at Principles 2, 11.
137 Id. at Principle 2.
138 Id. at Principle 5.
139 Id. at Principle 3.
140 Id. at Principle 7.
141 Id. at Principle 13.  Principle 13 also instructs, “Consumer ADR agreements which
provide for binding arbitration should establish procedures for arbitrator-supervised exchange
of information prior to arbitration, bearing in mind the expedited nature of arbitration.”
142 Id. at Principle 14 (“The arbitrator should be empowered to grant whatever relief
would be available in court under law or in equity.”).
143 Id. at Principle 6.
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Procedures, the Consumer’s portion of the arbitrator’s fees is capped at
$125 for claims under $10,000,144 whereas the business bears the totality
of the $750 administration fee.145
Similarly, the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS)
has a “Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness.”146  Like the AAA Protocol,
the JAMS policy purports to guarantee minimum standards of fairness in
the administration and implementation of adhesive arbitration agree-
ments in consumer agreements.147  Thus, the JAMS Policy requires that
the arbitration agreement be reciprocally binding on both parties; retain
both parties’ access to small claims court; provide clear notice to the
consumer of the arbitration clause’s existence, terms, and implications;
reserve all remedies available at law; provide the consumer with an op-
portunity to participate in the arbitrator selection; give the consumer a
right to a hearing in his “hometown area;” and allow for discovery.148
With respect to costs, if the consumer initiates the dispute, the consumer
cost is $250.149  All other costs must be paid by the company.  If the
company initiates the arbitration, the company must pay all fees.150
The third major arbitration service, the National Arbitration Forum
(NAF), does not have a separate policy or protocol solely applicable to
consumer cases, yet its Arbitration Bill of Rights,151 Code of Proce-
dure,152 and Fee Schedule153 treat consumers differently than commer-
cial entities so that many of the same protections are afforded to
consumers as those that are formally delineated under the AAA and
144 American Arbitration Association, Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Proce-
dures, at C-8 (2007), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
145 Id. This is the fee if neither party’s claim or counter-claim exceeds $10,000.  If a
hearing is held, the business must pay the $200 hearing fee.  If a claim exceeds $10,000, the
administrative and hearing fees go up, but the business still bears the burden of payment.
146 JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum
Standards of Procedural Fairness (2007), http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/Consumer_
Arbitration_Min_Std.PDF.
147 Id.
148 Id. ¶ 1–5, 9.  The policy is obviously directed at establishing minimum standards of
fairness in the context of the form contract where no negotiations or viable options are reason-
ably available to the consumer.  Thus, they do not apply “if the agreement to arbitrate was
negotiated by the individual consumer and the company.” Id. at n.1.
149 Id. at § 7.
150 Id.
151 National Arbitration Forum, Arbitration Bill of Rights with Commentary (2007)
[hereinafter NAF Arbitration Bill of Rights], http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/
ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf
152 National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure (2008) [hereinafter NAF Code of Pro-
cedure], http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/CodeofProcedure2008-print2.pdf.
153 National Arbitration Forum, Fee Schedule to Code of Procedure 3 (2008) [hereinafter
NAF Fee Schedule], http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/2008FeeSchedule-Final
Print1.pdf.
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JAMS.  For example, the NAF’s Bill of Rights delineates twelve princi-
ples to promote fair administration: “The FORUM will not administer
arbitrations under contracts that do not meet these principles.”154  These
principles include guarantees of reasonable access to information about
the arbitration process,155 convenient and efficient hearings,156 “reasona-
ble access” to information for discovery for both parties,157 and the guar-
antee that “remedies resulting from arbitration must conform to the
law.”158  The Bill of Rights also instructs that “[t]he cost of an arbitration
should be proportionate to the claim and reasonably within the means of
the parties, as required by applicable law.”159  Although this statement
would carry little force on its own, the NAF implements this principle
through their fee schedule.  The fee schedule provides a sliding scale for
fees such that a claim less than $1,500 requires a $19 filing fee, a claim
between $1,501-$3,500 requires a $29 filing fee, and so on.160  Thus,
most low-value consumer claims require a $19 filing fee when the con-
sumer is a claimant; there is no filing fee for a response.161  The NAF
requires the business to pay the $200 administrative fee,162 but the con-
sumer would be required to pay one half of the fee for a participatory
hearing, up to a maximum of $250.163  For claims under $1,500, one half
of the $125 participatory hearing fee would be $62.50, assessed to the
consumer.164  If the business requests the participatory hearing, it bears
the full cost of the hearing.165  Finally, the NAF consumer/party may
154 See NAF Arbitration Bill of Rights, supra note 151, at 1.
155 Id. at Principle 2.
156 Id. at Principle 10.  Under the NAF Code of Procedure, supra note 152, R. 32(A), any
in-person hearing must be held at “a reasonably convenient location within the United States
federal judicial district or other national judicial district where the Respondent to the Initial
Claim resides or does business.  A Respondent Entity does business where it has minimum
contacts with a Consumer.”  Thus, for most consumer cases, an in-person hearing would be
held in the judicial district near the area in which the consumer engaged in the transaction
giving rise to the dispute.
157 NAF Arbitration Bill of Rights, supra note 151, at Principle 11.
158 Id. at Principle 12.  However, this guarantee is not as protective as those discussed in
the AAA Protocol and the JAMS Policy.  The AAA Protocol, supra note 135, and the JAMS
Policy, supra note 146, instruct that arbitration clauses should not be drafted as to limit reme-
dies available at law, whereas the NAF Bill of Rights specifies only that remedies should
“conform to law.”  NAF Arbitration Bill of Rights, supra note 151.
159 NAF Arbitration Bill of Rights, supra note 151, at Principle 6.
160 NAF Fee Schedule, supra note 153, at 3.
161 See id. at 3.
162 This would be for a claim less than $1,500.  The administrative fee, like the filing fee,
increases proportionally to the claim value, but the business is required to pay the administra-
tive fee “unless otherwise provided by agreement of the Parties or by applicable law.” Id.
163 Id. at 3.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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apply for indigent relief governed by the United States federal poverty
standards or other applicable law.166
B. The Short-Comings of the Second-Generation Arbitration Clause
As the polices adopted by the three major arbitration services illus-
trate, after the first wave of consumer arbitration agreements, the con-
sumer products industry as a whole (whether voluntarily or not) was
required to draft arbitration agreements affording minimum standards of
fairness, and providing arbitration to consumers at a relatively low dollar
amount when compared with court filing fees.167  In light of agreements
offering to pay all costs of arbitration in excess of the $125 (for example)
attributed to the consumer, how could courts possibly consider these
agreements unfair?
The problem, evidenced in the decisions of the courts in recent
cases such as Scott, Kinkel, and Kristian,168 was not that the cost of arbi-
trating a $1,000 claim for $125 was unfair to the consumer—considering
very low dollar claims such as those for $30, $10, or even fifty cents—
but that there was no incentive for the individual consumer to bring a
recovery action.169  In other words, without the collective action, the
payout for a successful low-dollar claim would never overcome the ini-
tial barrier, whether it be $125 or $25.  Thus, courts reasoned, for these
very low-value claims for which the individual pay-out was insufficient
to reward pursuit of the claim, the class arbitration waiver prevented the
consumer from vindicating statutory rights by being prohibitively expen-
sive to arbitrate.  Moreover, according to these courts, the elimination of
the class contingency fee eliminated any incentive for an attorney to re-
present a consumer with a low-value claim—even if the attorney could
166 NAF Code of Procedure, supra note 152, R. 45(B).
167 The filing fee in a typical state court may range from $125 to $350, depending on the
damages claim, see Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County: Schedule of Fees
(2009), http://www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/fees.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009), or $350 for fed-
eral court, see United States District Court for the Central District of California: Schedule of
Fees (2006), http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/Cacd/forms.nsf/0b2b50f03ce1d589882567c
80058610a/66cc90529a00dc1688256dcf005f4ac3?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
In contrast, the maximum a consumer would pay under any of the three services for a tradi-
tionally “low-value claim”—i.e., under $2,500, would be $250 with the JAMs service.  JAMS
Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Pro-
cedural Fairness, supra note 146, at Standard 7.  But the consumer could prevail for as little as
the $19 fee charged by the NAF.  NAF Fee Schedule, supra note 153, at 3.
168 See supra Part II.B.2.
169 Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1007 (Wash. 2007) (“Shifting the cost of
arbitration to Cingular does not seem likely to make it worth the time, energy, and stress to
pursue such individually small claims”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir.
2006) (“Plaintiffs have provided uncontested and unopposed expert affidavits demonstrating
that without some form of class mechanism—be it class action or class arbitration—a con-
sumer antitrust plaintiff will not sue at all.”).
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recover attorney’s fees, the promise of attorney fees was inadequate.170
Although there is an argument that a consumer could have opted out of
the right to maintain a class action for a “low-value claim” in exchange
for the guarantee that he would preserve his right to arbitration for a
more substantial claim (i.e., any claim for which the payout is more than
the cost of arbitration, which could be as low as $19); the lack of choice
in accepting arbitration agreements made the likelihood of this trade-off
slim.  As the Illinois Supreme Court in Kinkel stated:
If there is a pattern in these cases [determining enforce-
ability of class arbitration waivers] it is this: a class ac-
tion waiver will not be found unconscionable if the
plaintiff had a meaningful opportunity to reject the con-
tract term or if the agreement containing the waiver is
not burdened by other features limiting the ability of the
plaintiff to obtain a remedy for the particular claim being
asserted in a cost-effective manner.171
Thus, even with the Consumer Protocol, Policy, and Bill of Rights
afforded by the arbitration institutions (and early case law), two main
issues with the class arbitration waiver remained: providing options and
providing incentives for low-dollar claims.
IV. THE CONSUMER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE: OPTIONAL
INCENTIVIZING INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
As with the first wave of arbitration clauses in which more onerous
provisions were held unenforceable by courts, and dropped from arbitra-
tion language by the industry, consumers—via the courts—have spoken,
and the industry has adapted.  One may wonder at this point, why con-
tinue to demand the class arbitration waiver?  If class arbitration waivers
may render the arbitration clause as a whole unenforceable, why choose
to include them?  The answer lies in the goals of arbitration, which is to
allow parties less expensive, less complex, and a more expedient alterna-
tive to the formality of the courts.  By permitting class arbitration, with
its attendant discovery, class certification, and class settlement formali-
ties, the parties essentially forgo the advantages of arbitration.  Thus, the
170 See, e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 n.21. (“[B]eing made whole is hardly a sufficient
incentive for an attorney to invest in a case such as this when time spent on more predictable
case would be advantageous, and frankly, rational.”).
171 Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274 (Ill. 2006).  The Kinkel court found
Cingular Wireless’s 2001 arbitration agreement unconscionable in that case because the arbi-
tration clause, which did not specify the cost of arbitration to the consumer, contained a liqui-
dated damages clause in the amount of $150, which “creat[ed] a situation where the cost of
vindicating the claim is so high that the plaintiff’s only reasonable, cost-effective means of
obtaining a complete remedy is as either the representative or a member of a class.” Id. at 275.
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question is not simply, whether class actions are a good thing or a bad
thing, but whether there can ever be a contractually agreed-to alternative
to the class mechanism.172  The industry response has been encouraging,
and shows a sign that the evolution of the consumer products arbitration
clause has not reached its end.
A. Freedom to Choose
The main obstacle in adhesive consumer arbitration agreements is
the lack of choice—to remove the “take it or leave it” thumb that
weighed heavily against the drafters of class arbitration waivers.  The
industry is beginning to accomplish this through the unremarkable, but
seemingly successful “opt-out agreement.”  For example, Comcast’s
Corporation’s agreement for residential services requires binding arbitra-
tion with a class action waiver.  But it also contains this provision:
Right to Opt Out.  If you do not wish to be bound by this
arbitration provision, you must notify Comcast in writ-
ing within 30 days of the date that you first receive this
agreement by visiting www.comcast.com/arbitration
optout, or by mail to Comcast . . . .  Your decision to opt
out of this arbitration provision will have no adverse ef-
fect on your relationship with Comcast . . . .173
Other consumer-products companies have adopted this provision in
an effort to give consumers an opportunity to choose to waive binding
arbitration if maintaining the right to a judicial forum, and the class
mechanism, is sufficiently important to the consumer at the time the con-
tract is entered into.174  Because the consumer has the opportunity and
choice to remove the arbitration agreement and the class arbitration
172 See supra note 118.
173 Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, § 13(c), http://www.comcast.com (fol-
low “Customers”; then follow “Customer Agreements/Policies”; then follow “Customer
Agreement for Residential Services” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).  Although Comcast
does give its consumers the right to opt out, which renders the contract less procedurally
unfair, there are other components of its arbitration agreement that would be problematic in
some venues.  For example, Comcast’s arbitration agreement requires “all parties [to] waive
any claim to indirect, consequential, punitive, exemplary or multiplied damages arising from
or out of any dispute with Comcast unless the statute under which they are suing provides
otherwise.” Id. § 13(f)(3).  The savings clause excepting statutory claims may salvage this
agreement from vindication-of-statutory-rights defenses, but the waiver of consequential and
punitive damages of common law claims may cause some courts to view this provision as
substantively unfair.  Additionally, Comcast agrees to pay all costs of arbitration only if the
claimant is successful, otherwise the consumer must reimburse Comcast for the fees and costs
advances “to the extent awardable in a judicial proceeding.” Id. § 13(h).
174 See, e.g., Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(noting that the option to opt out of arbitration agreement by providing notice in writing within
60 days provided meaningful choice to opt out, and therefore was not procedurally
unconscionable).
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waiver within 30 days of obtaining the service or product, and incurs no
adverse consequences for opting out, this removes the elements of proce-
dural unconscionability found onerous by some courts.175  Opponents of
the arbitration clause in the context of consumer agreement may still ar-
gue that the consumer has little choice: Consumers may not read a ser-
vices/purchase agreement, or they may not know enough about
arbitration at the time of the agreement to be expected to know whether
he or she should opt out.176  But ignorance, or worse, apathy, has almost
never been held a defense to a freely entered contract in which the party
had a legitimate option.
To be sure, there is an even better vehicle for ensuring contemplated
consumer choice in accepting the arbitration clause: differentiated pric-
ing by acceptance or rejection at the point of sale.  If pre-dispute agree-
ments to individual arbitration accomplish in practice what they should
in theory—reduced litigation costs to the business—these savings should
be passed along to the consumer in the form of lower prices for con-
sumer products.177  In other words, the consumer who opts out of bind-
ing arbitration in order to preserve a judicial forum and the class
mechanism should have to pay a premium in order to preserve poten-
tially expensive litigation to the supplier.  Despite the attractions of the
differentiated pricing scheme, it has not yet been widely adopted, per-
haps due to administrative costs.178  And, to some consumers, this ap-
proach would also be unfair—under the traditional opt-out agreements
discussed above, the consumer can opt out of the arbitration agreement
175 See supra Part II.A.
176 See Stempel, supra note 2, at 433 (“Consumers at a big-box retail outlet are not realis-
tically able to conclude that their interests are best served by arbitrating all disputes before a
select arbitration provider . . . .”).
177 See Ware, supra note 54, at 255–56.  Ware explains:
In the case of consumer arbitration agreements, this benefit to businesses is also a
benefit to consumers.  That is because whatever lowers costs to businesses tends
over time to lower prices to consumers.  While the entire cost-savings is passed on to
consumers only under conditions of perfect competition, some of the cost-savings is
passed on to consumers under non-competitive conditions, even monopoly.  The ex-
tent to which cost-savings are passed on to consumers is determined by the elasticity
of supply and demand in the relevant markets.  Therefore, the size of the price reduc-
tion caused by enforcement of consumer arbitration agreements will vary, as will the
time it takes to occur.  But it is inconsistent with basic economics to question the
existence of the price reduction.
178 Imagine undergoing a conversation with a cashier every time one engages in a con-
sumer-product transaction in which the consumer is advised of binding arbitration, explained
its terms in detail, and then offered the chance to accept it for a lower price.  The inconve-
nience and extra costs in educating consumers and sales personnel make it seem an unlikely
alternative.  Additionally, without knowing the numbers of opt-ins or opt-outs, how does a
manufacturer value the cost of the opt-out so as to set a fair price approximating the extra cost
of some individuals’ decision to preserve the class action?  Although these issues may not
establish insurmountable barriers, they do present issues that are not present with the standard
opt-out clause.
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with no adverse effects or additional costs.  Regardless of the advantages
or disadvantages of either scheme, they both share the integral common-
ality of providing the consumer legitimate choices in agreeing to binding,
individual arbitration.  Instead of proposing paternalistic, all-encompass-
ing legislation that would prevent any consumer from agreeing to pre-
dispute arbitration, pro-consumer class action groups such as Public Citi-
zen could devote their resources to educating the consumer public
through mailing newsletters, internet broadcasts, and other modes about
the nature of the class action and the situations in which it may be advis-
able to opt out of the class arbitration waiver.179  The crucial point is that
the opt-out agreement leaves the decision to the consumer to decide.
B. Incentivizing Agreements
The second, and largest issue to be addressed by courts failing to
enforce the class arbitration waiver, is the discovery of an adequate re-
placement for the class vehicle in motivating consumers to litigate low-
value claims and in providing sufficient monetary incentives such that
there will be reasonably accessible attorney assistance.  Before exploring
the incentivizing agreements, however, one must clarify the frame of
analysis.  Of course, if the goal is to retain the option to dispute all
claims regardless of how small, frivolous, or unimportant, there is likely
no alternative than the class vehicle.  This mechanism, with its positive
attributes, also provides a heavy weight for class representatives who
would merely bring annoyance suits.  But if one could envision an agree-
ment by which a consumer agrees to forgo the right to class representa-
tion for low-value claims (claims for which the consumer may care very
little about, and stand little to no chance for recovery),180 in exchange for
free, expedient arbitration for more substantial claims, this could be
favorable to many consumers.  In addition, unlike class actions which
may take several years to litigate or result in a settlement payout, the
arbitration process and reward is remarkably fast  in comparison.181
179 As discussed infra Part IV.B, it is not always beneficial to opt out of the arbitration
agreement with the class arbitration waiver.  There are certainly foreseeable situations in
which the consumer has the advantage in pursuing individual claims with arbitration that is, in
essence, free.
180 A consumer very well may find the typical recovery in a class action completely
worthless, as many class actions settle for nominal monetary value to the individual class
member, and may only result in a coupon or voucher that the consumer finds of little to no
value.
181 For example, the AAA requires an arbitrator to render a decision for a case decided on
the papers within fourteen days, unless the parties agree otherwise.  American Arbitration As-
sociation, supra note 144, at C-7.  Studies show that the typical arbitration process takes from
four to six months from initiation to award. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ANALYSIS
OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION’S CONSUMER ARBITRATION CASELOAD (2007),
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5027 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
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Moreover, there is nothing to support the arbitration opponents’ argu-
ment that individuals will be less likely to succeed in arbitration.  To the
contrary, preliminary studies show that at least in the employment con-
text, plaintiffs are more likely to be victorious in arbitration than in
court.182  Thus, one must at least consider the idea that in some situa-
tions, individual arbitration fully compensated by the manufacturer/seller
can result in a recovery that is more advantageous on an individual basis
than would be the recovery per individual member of a class.  And it is
important to remember that for low-value claims that no consumer may
wish to litigate, the state attorney general or appropriate administrative
agency is still the main accessible resource for policing wrongful conduct
to prevent corporations from escaping liability for low-value claims.183
Accepting this premise that consumers are sometimes, even often-
times, better off arbitrating individual claims for which they may be enti-
tled to full recovery, than maintaining the opportunity to participate in
low-value claim class actions, some companies have adopted an adequate
“incentivizing agreement” that would encourage meritorious, albeit low-
value claims, on an individual basis.  An example of this is the third-
generation arbitration clause drafted by AT&T, formerly Cingular Wire-
less, which offers a significant “premium” for both the consumer and the
attorney when the consumer recovers an amount in a low-value claim
($10,000 or less)184 that is greater than AT&T’s last written settlement
offer.185  If the consumer does recover more than AT&T’s last written
settlement offer, in addition to having the arbitration fully subsidized by
182 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding
Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 184 (2008) (discussing
a survey of employment arbitrations where “[e]mployees won more often in arbitration than
similar plaintiffs in court”).
183 See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing
the availability of administrative enforcement mechanisms); Francis v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
No. 07-CV-14921, 2009 WL 416063, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2009) (recognizing that state
attorney general provides additional avenue of consumer rights enforcement).
184 Although this amount may be characterized as “low-value,” for many consumer prod-
uct claims, an individual recovery of an amount near $10,000 is probably viewed by many
(myself included) as significant.
185 See infra note 186.  AT&T’s arbitration clause includes a nonseverable class arbitra-
tion waiver:
YOU AND AT&T AGREE THAT EACH MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE
OTHER ONLY IN YOUR OR ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS A
PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR REPRE-
SENTATIVE PROCEEDING.  Further, unless both you and AT&T agree otherwise,
the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not other-
wise preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding.  If this specific
provision is found to be unenforceable, then the entirety of this arbitration provision
shall be null and void.
AT&T Wireless Service Agreement http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/articles-resources/
wireless-terms.jsp (follow “Terms of Service” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
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AT&T, AT&T pays the consumer the greater of the amount of the award
or $10,000.186  By accepting this premium—or incentive—a consumer
has the potential to turn a meritorious low-value claim (for example a
claim of $30) into a substantial recovery of at least $10,000.  Of course,
AT&T can always avoid the premium by offering to settle with the con-
sumer for the maximum amount the consumer could recover (this should
include any statutory minimums or remedial damages to which the con-
sumer is entitled by law).  In our example, AT&T would be much better
off by simply offering the consumer $30 rather than risk paying the pre-
mium.  But even in this scenario, the consumer is made whole before the
formal arbitration process has begun.187  If AT&T does not make an ap-
propriate offer to avoid compelling the consumer to arbitration, and the
claim is meritorious, the consumer is afforded a windfall.  Thus, the pro-
vision replaces the class incentive by adding promises of substantial,
cost-effective individual recovery in two ways: (1) it provides the oppor-
tunity for a significant windfall to the consumer forced into arbitration by
AT&T’s refusal to settle claims that are meritorious, and (2) it imposes
significant incentives on AT&T to offer the consumer’s demand pre-ar-
bitration in cases in which there is a likelihood that the consumer may
186 The relevant language of AT&T’s arbitration agreements is:
If, after finding in your favor in any respect on the merits of your claim, the arbitra-
tor issues you an award that is greater than the value of AT&T’s last written settle-
ment offer made before an arbitrator was selected, then AT&T will:
• pay you the amount of the award or $10,000 (“the alternative payment”), which-
ever is greater; and
• pay your attorney, if any, twice the amount of attorneys’ fees, and reimburse any
expenses (including expert witness fees and costs) that your attorney reasonably
accrues for investigating, preparing, and pursuing your claim in arbitration (“the
attorney premium”).
If AT&T did not make a written offer to settle the dispute before an arbitrator was
selected, you and your attorney will be entitled to receive the alternative payment
and the attorney premium, respectively, if the arbitrator awards you any relief on the
merits. The arbitrator may make rulings and resolve disputes as to the payment and
reimbursement of fees, expenses, and the alternative payment and the attorney pre-
mium at any time during the proceeding and upon request from either party made
within 14 days of the arbitrator’s ruling on the merits.
Id. With respect to fully funding the arbitration fee, the arbitration clause states:
Except as otherwise provided for herein, AT&T will pay all AAA filing, administra-
tion, and arbitrator fees for any arbitration initiated in accordance with the notice
requirements above.  If, however, the arbitrator finds that either the substance of
your claim or the relief sought in the Demand is frivolous or brought for an improper
purpose (as measured by the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(b)), then the payment of all such fees will be governed by the AAA Rules.
Id.
187 As stated above, to protect itself from the premium by making an offer equal to or
greater than the arbitrator’s final award, AT&T must do so before an arbitrator is selected. See
id.
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win at arbitration in order to avoid paying the incentive fee.188  The
worst case scenario for the consumer is that his or her claim is unsuc-
cessful at arbitration and AT&T made no written settlement offer.  Even
then, on an unsuccessful claim, the consumer has encumbered little to no
financial investment (outside attorney’s fees) because AT&T is still re-
quired to pay all costs of arbitration unless the claim is deemed frivolous
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.189  Thus, the con-
sumer has an incentive to vindicate low-value claims at almost no cost to
himself, outside of legal/expert preparation for the arbitration
proceeding.
But the cost of legal assistance is a weighty consideration for most
courts.  Recognizing that the consumer-attorney market is unwilling to
take low-value claims absent the class mechanism, even with the promise
of reasonable attorney fees, some courts have held that the absence of
legal representation prevents the consumer from vindicating statutory
rights.190  Thus, in addition to providing incentives for the consumer, the
arbitration agreement must also provide incentives for the attorneys
bringing the claim.  The AT&T provision does this in a manner nearly
identical to the consumer premium—by guaranteeing double attorney
fees for any low-value claim in which the consumer receives an award
188 To date, at least two courts have addressed fairness challenges to the “incentivizing
agreement.”  In Francis II v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 07-CV-14921, 2009 WL 416063, at
*4–5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2009), the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that his right to
recover under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act was eviscerated by the class arbitration
waiver.  The court found that the possibility of recovering $5,000 (then the minimal reimburse-
ment amount provided in AT&T’s Arbitration Agreement), plus double attorney’s fees was
“fair to the extent [the plaintiff] could effectively enforce his MCPA rights in AAA arbitra-
tion.” Id. at *5.  In rejecting the plaintiff’s unconsionability argument, the court found that the
incentive agreement, “provides a significant incentive for [the plaintiff] to pursue his
$1,143.00 MCPA claim in individual arbitration.” Id. at *6.  In response to the plaintiff’s
argument that AT&T’s ability to avoid the incentive by offering an appropriate pre-settlement
offer rendered the incentive illusory, the court found that he ignored “the goal of informally
resolving billing disputes before they reach arbitration.” Id. at *9.
The court in Steiner v. Apple Computer, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1030 (N.D. Cal.
2008). reached the opposite conclusion.  The Steiner court concluded that the incentive is
illusory because AT&T need only settle in full before the consumer proceeds with arbitration.
The Court reasoned that AT&T need only settle in full with a certain percentage of plaintiffs,
when at some point, consumers would become convinced that the maximum recovery would
be the damages amount, not the Premium.  However, the Steiner court did not address the
prospectively economical trade-off to the individual consumer at the time the sales agreement
was made of having the opportunity to recover damages in whole with no arbitration costs.
The court’s analysis seems to suggest that the unconscionability test it invoked includes a
focus on other putative members of a class, not the individual plaintiff’s, incentive to recover
for even low-value claims. Steiner is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.  United States Court of Appeals Docket # 08-15612.
189 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190 See e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58 & n. 21 (1st Cir. 2006); Ting v.
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 319 F.3d 1126
(9th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1007 (Wash. 2007).
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more favorable than AT&T’s last written offer, irrespective of whether
the governing law requires attorney fees or not.191  Thus, there is an op-
portunity for a cottage market of consumer attorneys to recover double
fees by assisting consumers in bringing meritorious consumer products
actions.  Although each individual recovery would not come close to ri-
valing the enormous payoffs for bringing class-action claims, this incen-
tive should develop a market for the enterprising consumer attorneys
asserting relatively non-complex, meritorious consumer products claims.
The withdrawal of confidentiality provisions from most consumer prod-
ucts arbitration provisions can aid in developing this market—consumer
products attorneys can advertise recoveries, informally aggregate claims
and discovery, and draw on past expertise to make arbitration of pattern
consumer litigation more cost-effective.  Given that many consumer
claims are relatively simple proceedings decided solely on the papers,192
a practice partially devoted to submitting consumer product arbitration
claims of similar nature could prove quite lucrative even if only a per-
centage of the claims resulted in double recovery.
The one major drawback to this type of incentivizing arrangement is
that it does not provide a guaranteed incentive to the attorney in cases of
pre-arbitration settlement, unless the attorney would be guaranteed statu-
tory fees.193  However, AT&T could resolve this issue by offering to
include a thirty percent premium within any settlement offer triggering
the premium clause to afford the attorney a typical contingency fee with-
out reducing the consumer’s recovery.194  In our prior example then, if
the consumer’s demand was $30, AT&T could be required to offer at
least $40 to avoid the premium if the arbitration award is favorable to the
consumer.  Again, even in this scenario the total attorney payoff would
191 Id. The right to the attorney premium supplements existing law. Thus if the attorney
would be entitled to a larger award under applicable law, the attorney premium does not re-
place it.  However, AT&T does not permit duplicate awards, i.e., the attorney premium in
addition to statutory awards.  AT&T Wireless Service Agreement, supra note 186.
192 Under the AAA rules, claims under $10,000 are resolved upon submission of the doc-
uments, unless one party requests a hearing.  American Arbitration Association, Consumer-
Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, at C-5, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2009).
193 Although the arbitration clause is unclear as to whether the settlement offer triggering
the premium clause would necessarily include statutorily required attorney fees, it seems that
an arbitrator could conclude that an award of attorney’s fees would be included in the offer
amount if they are statutorily required.
194 It appears that in fact, it is AT&T’s practice to do just this.  In Steiner v. Apple Com-
puter, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1031–32 (N.D. Cal. 2008), AT&T defended its attorney
premium by arguing that “customers who are aided by counsel in pursuing their disputes are
likely to receive settlement offers that include reasonable attorneys’ fees.”  (quoting AT&T’s
Reply Br. at 7:7-8) (emphasis in published opinion).  Because AT&T did not include data as to
how many customers received attorney’s fees, nor quantify “reasonable,” the court rejected
this argument.  A better practice of course, would be to include a guarantee of a quantifiable
attorney fee in the settlement offer that the consumer is awarded if represented by an attorney.
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offer significantly less financial payout to representative attorneys than
the financial boon of the class action, but the trade would restore the
payoff to the individual consumer, who at a minimum would receive full
recovery for meritorious claims.  This trade-off seems to be one with
which the American public would be quite satisfied.195
C. Deterrence
Even though the new optional “incentivizing” arbitration agree-
ments do much to remove individual arbitration from the vindication-of-
statutory-rights or unconscionability defenses, there is still one concern
that may loom in the background of paternalistic courts—that of deter-
rence.  If the class mechanism does nothing else, its mere presence as the
public “watchdog” encourages corporations to toe the line, and provides
a vehicle for penalizing the corporate wrongdoer—even if the monetary
damage to each individual consumer is not significant.  So how do we
achieve deterrence through individual arbitration?  Of course, the attor-
ney general’s role in policing certain claims that individuals find too in-
significant to pursue individually cannot be forgotten.196  If a corporation
is engaging in certain wrong-doing that is injurious to the public, even if
the monetary damage is nominal, it is certainly within the attorney gen-
eral’s responsibility to assert such claims on behalf of the public. Compa-
nies wishing to offer class arbitration waivers could also alleviate this
public concern by agreeing to report settled claims and arbitral awards to
the state attorney general’s office.  Further, perhaps in the absence of
numerous class actions, administrative agencies such as the Consumer
Product Safety Commission would develop a more prominent role in
safety control, but the idea that without the class action, all deterrence
would be lost is certainly a misconception.  If a company offering an
incentivizing agreement paid $10,000 several times for a low-value
claim, certainly it would catch the corporate eye (or that of its sharehold-
ers), although not to the potentially crippling extent class action settle-
ments may penalize.  And, if sufficient numbers of consumers bring
individual arbitration suits to recover valid claims, the expense of subsi-
dizing arbitration, paying damages, and perhaps statutory damages or at-
torney fees will eventually cause a deterrent effect. This effect will be
particularly apparent if the plaintiff consumer products bar adapts to the
incentivizing agreements and initiates a pattern of individual arbitration
in claims that are wide-spread.  This sort of deterrence, in which compa-
nies are penalized only when individual consumers, as opposed to a
195 See generally Ware, supra note 54, at 255 (discussing the cost savings associated with
consumer arbitration agreements and noting that the “[B]enefit to businesses is also a benefit
to consumers.”).
196 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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small percentage of class representatives, feel sufficiently wronged to
pursue a complaint, will likely approximate more precisely the kind of
conduct the American public wishes to deter.197
CONCLUSION
The American public, through the courts, and corporate America
have been engaging in a decade-long dialogue regarding the construction
and implementation of binding individual arbitration.  Although the sec-
ond phase of arbitration agreements in which corporations agreed to sub-
sidize much of the costs of arbitration, and removed unlawful liability
limitations, were very favorable to consumers litigating individual claims
in which the payoff was greater than the cost of arbitration, some courts
have recently refused to enforce these arbitration agreements because
they fail to provide consumers, and the attorneys who would represent
them, with sufficient incentives to bring low-value claims.  Corporations
interested in binding arbitration have responded.  New, third-generation
arbitration clauses are ameliorating the sense of unconscionability attend-
ant to binding individual arbitration by offering the consumer choice
through the opt-out mechanism.  And other agreements provide both
consumers and attorneys incentives designed to encourage the consumer
to bring meritorious low-value claims.  These incentivizing optional
agreements provide a fair vehicle for consumers who do not decide to opt
out and preserve the class mechanism, because many individuals may
view the trade-off of giving up low-value claims with little prospect of
pay-off for the opportunity to inexpensively and expediently arbitrate
claims that have more significant value as favorable.  Even with this
trade-off, the incentivizing agreements do provide lucrative opportunities
for consumers that assert successful low-value claims, thereby preserving
the consumer’s opportunity to vindicate statutory rights and deter poten-
tial wrong-doing by corporations.  This dialogue, via the courts, is the
type of behavior that should be encouraged, and the new optional, incen-
tivizing class arbitration waiver clauses demonstrate the evolution to-
wards a type of consumer purchase or service agreement that may be
more beneficial, at the time of the sales agreement, than the class action
mechanism.
197 For example, the American public may not feel sufficiently rewarded by the coupon
vouchers that some class members receive as settlement.  There may be some economic con-
duct that is simply so insignificant that the public does not seek to deter it.
